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 This paper examines whether state-specific public sector collective bargaining 
institutions affect the per-capita level of government spending, employment, and payrolls. In 
order to empirically determine whether a more “pro”-union institutional environment leads 
to increases in these variables this study uses a panel data set of the 50 states over a 55 year 
period and utilizes the NBER Collective Bargaining ranking scale. This study is the first to 
explicitly look at the effect of compulsory vs. non-compulsory public sector collective 
bargaining laws and is also the first to use synthetic control methods to estimate the 
relationship.  
 
 Results show that the more favorable the legal environment for public unions 
government expenditures increase from $104.1-125.1 to $546.0-653.5 per-capita. The results 
show a statistically significant, yet low positive effect on employment and wages. It is 
suggested that the increased expenditures may be due to other factors such as increased 
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 State and local governments have been expanding and taking on a growing number 
of responsibilities in recent years. Understanding the nature of this growth is imperative to 
understanding whether the government is growing for reasons that allow for increased social 
benefit. It is well founded that special interest groups, such as unions, can have substantial 
influence on government policies and activities. Generally special interest groups are formed 
outside of the government, however public sector employees are substantially different. 
These special interest groups are created from within the government and represent the 
interests of the government’s own employees—their livelihood is determined by the size and 
scope of the government. Because of this state and local government decision makers can be 
influenced towards the interests of those within the government at the possible detriment to 
the public. 
 Worker’s unions grew out of a need for individual workers to associate with one 
another and work toward a common workplace goal. Unions were initially seen as positive 
organizations due to their alleged ability to have increased the day-to-day conditions of 
workers in the early 20th Century.  These early associations of workers were a natural 
outgrowth of individuals choosing to associate themselves with others to obtain a voluntarily 
agreed upon goal, usually improvements in the quality of their work environments or each 
worker’s “work-life balance.” Since 2009 there have been more public-sector union 
members in America than their private sector counterparts giving rise to the necessity of 
detailed analyses of these union’s effects on state economies.1  
 
 Public and private sector unions are vastly different.  Private sector workers 
choose to work between competing firms and actively threaten to use the mobility of their 
labor and the existing competitive market to achieve changes within the structure or 
environment of their current employment.  A firm cannot be productive if it is unable to 
maintain a workforce.  Public sector workers, on the other hand, are able to keep the same 
job, more or less maintaining the same work environment, and contrary to private sector 
counterparts, are able to democratically choose/influence who their “superiors” are/will be 
to attain the changes, or in some cases stop changes, they see necessary.  By doing this they 
can directly affect the demand for their labor.  
 
 Unions in the public sector have significantly different structural environment 
compared to private sector unions. The lack of market competition for products and 
services as well as a lack of fiscal discipline due to the political process and reliance on 
taxation make the benefits of having a larger union much more prevalent for public 
employees relative to private sector employees.2 
 
                                                          
1 Hirsch, Barry T. and David A. Macpherson, “Union Membership and Coverage Database from the CPS,” 
2013, http://www.unionstats.com. 




 Historical data supports the notion that public sector workers are more 
incentivized and ultimately face less barriers to unionization as compared to private sector 
workers. Since 1973 public sector workers have had a higher union membership rate 
compared to the private sector. This higher rate for public sector workers has grown over 
time and remained steady between 35-40% since 1973 whereas private sector worker union 
membership rates have declined over the same time period and steadied out around 
approximately 7%.3 
 
 Intuitively, the more prevalent the presence of a union, the more of an effect it will 
potentially have on political outcomes or the more success it will have in pressuring those 
already elected to office to support their agendas and thereby increase government 
expenditures and activities. This study seeks to determine whether we can empirically 
conclude that a more “pro”-union institutional environment leads to an expansion in public 
spending, employment, and payrolls using panel data of the 50 states for over 55 years. 
 
 In my analysis I capitalize on the variation in state-specific public sector collective 
bargaining laws across different classes of workers (teachers, police, firefighters, state 
employees, and other local) within a state and over time to identify the effects these laws 
have on public sector labor market outcomes as well as state and local government 
expenditures. 
Overview and History of Public Sector Collective Bargaining 
Regulations 
 
 Collective bargaining by state and local government employees is determined by 
legislation passed at the state level and generally varies widely between states and within 
states between different classifications of government workers. In general the legislation that 
governs public sector employee unions contains provisions on whether an employee class 
has the right to collectively bargain, the types of issues able to be bargained on (workplace 
conditions, compensation, etc.), and dispute resolution mechanisms. Once legislation is in 
place that allows public sector employees to organize it is fairly easy for them to begin to 
create unions because the nature of political bureaucracies does not particularly incentivize 
employers to resist organization.4 
 
 The history of public sector unions begins with the development of private sector 
unionism. While the two are very different, if it wasn’t for the growth of private-sector 
unions, the public sector within America may never have unionized at all.  
 In the late 19th Century the labor policy throughout the country can best be 
described as being based on equal legal rights afforded to both employees and workers. 
Every individual (and by legal definition corporation) was treated equally and interactions 
between two parties were freely voluntary and contractual. 
                                                          
3 Hirsch and Macpherson op cit. note 1 
4 Farber op cit note 2 
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 This labor system began to be challenged by the turn of the 20th Century when 
businesses started to grow larger and command more wealth. By passing the National Labor 
Relations, “Wagner,” Act in 1935 the federal government decided to take action based on 
the premise that an unequal bargaining power existed between employees and employers. 
The Wagner Act established legal provisions that gave organized unions artificial privileges 
by outlawing “unfair labor practices“ by their employers while also forcing them to 
collectively bargain in good faith with any organization that a majority of its employees had 
chosen to represent their interests. 
 The Wagner Act applied only to private sector unions.5 Up to this point, public 
unions had already endured legislative scrutiny from varying branches of the federal 
government. Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft felt that organized 
lobbying by public employees to Congress could lead to negative outcomes. Both Presidents 
issued Executive Orders that prohibited federal employees from being members of these 
organizations. 
Opposition to public-sector unions continued into the years after the passage of the 
Wagner Act. The most popular and widely understood criticism was expressed by President 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1937. In FDR’s opinion collective bargaining for public 
employees was severely limited because “… [t]he very nature and purposes of government 
make it impossible…to bind the employer in mutual discussions…[because] the employer is 
the whole people.”6 Public sector unionism forces an unelected body into the policy decision 
making process that necessarily undermines the sovereignty of the government.7 Through 
compulsory collective bargaining “government employee unions effectively [transfer] the 
power to tax from voters to the unions.”8 
 The Wagner Act went unaltered until the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 
which allowed individual States to pass right-to-work laws that removed the compulsory 
membership requirement on employees within the State.9 This change to the legal structure, 
the evolution of the national economy from manufacturing to service during the post-World 
War II period, as well as increased openness to foreign competition, all eventually 
contributed to a decline in private union membership throughout the country.10 But, as soon 
as private-sector unions reached their highest point and began to decline, public sector 
unions were finally beginning to gain traction. 
                                                          
5 See section 2 of National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (49 Stat. 449) 29 U.S.C. § 151–169 
6 F.D.R. to Luther Steward, 16 Aug. 1937, in The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
comp. Samuel I Rosenman as quoted in Paul Moreno The History of Public Sector Unionism. Pg. 4 
7 Norcross, Eileen. Public sector unionism: A review. No. 11-26. Mercatus Center Working Paper, 2011. 
 pg. 1 
8 DiLorenzo, Thomas. “The Political Economy of Government Employee Unions” in Organized Crime: The 
Unvarnished Truth About Government by Thomas DiLorenzo 
9 The Act also outlawed the closed shop principle which permitted employers to agree to hire only union 
workers 
10 Norcross op cit note 7 
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The American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), 
which originated in Wisconsin, spearheaded the effort to legitimize public unions and 
increase awareness towards the lack of, and need for, bargaining rights for public employees.  
By 1956 it represented over 200,000 public employees.11 While there was no legal framework 
for public sector collective bargaining at this time, the AFSCME claimed to have “brokered” 
445 different agreements for local unions. 
 The AFSCME joined with the AFL-CIO, the largest federation of unions in the U.S., 
and worked to enact pro-public union legislation at the local governmental level. Their first 
“wins” came from aiding in the successful passage of collective bargaining laws for public 
employees in both Philadelphia in 1955 and later, New York City in 1958. Just after New 
York City passed its laws, Wisconsin became the first state government to pass public sector 
collective bargaining measures at the state-level.12 The Federal Government followed suit in 
1962 when President Kennedy signed Executive Order 10988 which permitted federal 
employees to form unions and collectively bargain on issues other than wages. Other cities 
and states followed in Wisconsin’s footsteps and began passing collective bargaining 
provisions of their own. 
 With a legal framework in place the membership of public labor unions grew 
dramatically, from 1955-1978 public union membership rates increased 5-fold.13 Once a 
government bureaucracy becomes unionized, it tends to stay unionized and there isn’t 
generally a threat of turnover for the employers of public unions (the government) like there 
is for private-sector unions.  Government jobs also tend to be more secure (private sector 
job loss is 2.5x that of the public sector), which lends support to the growth of these 
unions.14 
  This growth also stemmed from the fact that these unions, in a sense get to choose 
who their employers are without changing jobs.  The head of the New York City chapter of 
AFSCME famously stated, “We have the power, in a sense, to elect our own boss.”15  The 
growth of the unions caused them to hold more clout with their employers and enabled 
them to collectively bargain through not only the direct, legally established channels but also 
indirectly, through campaign contributions, political activism, and voting. 
 By roughly 1984 only a few states did not have any laws concerning public sector 
bargaining of some type. As of 2011 Mississippi was the only state to not have any explicit 
provision on public sector collective bargaining for any of the 5 potential public sector job 
categories. In many cases these laws only change once from 1957-2011 within each state. 
Out of 2750 observations state collective bargaining laws changed 75 times for state 
employees, 76 times for police, 85 times for firefighters, 75 times for teachers, and 63 times 
                                                          
11 Norcross op cit note 7 
12 It should be noted that shortly after this Congress passed the Landrum-Griffith Act of 1959 that sought to 
fight against corrupt union practices by mandating secret elections, disclosure of union finances, and specific 
measures to protect individual workers against union abuses. 
13 Norcross op cit note 7 pg 10 
14 Farber op cite note 2  
15 “Captive Politicians.” New York Times. 9 July 1975 
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for other local employees. This equates to each state changing their legal environment 1.26-
1.7 times over the 55 year time period.  
Theoretical Discussion 
 
 Economic theory sees unions as monopoly providers of public goods. Public 
sector unions can organize workers into politically active groups that work toward common 
and unified goals. Marlow and Ozrechowski suggest three reasons public employees may be 
interested in uniting together within unions: their ability to provide services to the public 
requires job security, their pay and benefit packages will increase, and they will be able to 
steer public policy in the direction they see fit from their perspective.16  
 
 These unions can be seen as providers of public goods because, generally speaking, 
they create non-rivalrous benefits for public employees—the marginal cost for lobbying on 
behalf of an additional worker and providing benefits is generally close to zero. Union 
leaders are able to aggregate the contributions of each worker and provide equal benefits 
while dispersing the costs. 
 
 Public Choice economists suggest that these monopoly-like public sector unions 
can influence public policy due to their special interest group nature and that it is within their 
self-interest to see the government expand.17 The bigger the government is the more stable 
their job and possibly the higher their wages: Win, Win. So long as public employees operate 
out of their own self-interest any benefit to the community that results from their choices 
will tend to be simply an accident. If we relax the assumption of self-interest and assume the 
opposite, that public employees are altruistic, we can arrive at the same conclusion that 
public employees will want the government to expand. In this case public employees 
genuinely believe that their work is contributing to societal well-being and that an expansion 
of the government and their job responsibilities will leave society better off in the end. Even 
if the real world is somewhere within the middle of these two extremes (most likely case) we 
can see that public sector employees have a clear incentive to be politically active and to 
attempt to increase the size and scope of the government, therefore increasing the demand 
for their own goods and services. 
 
 Public sector employees are generally more politically active than the majority of 
the voting public.18 Pressuring politicians to remain “union-friendly” could potentially lead to 
drastic changes in wages, benefits, department expenditures, and total employment of these 
                                                          
16 Marlow, Michael L., and William Orzechowski. "Public sector unions and public spending." Public Choice 
89, no. 1-2 (1996): 1-16. 
17 Buchanan, James M., and Gordon Tullock. "The expanding public sector: Wagner squared." Public Choice 
31, no. 1 (1977): 147-150 
18 See: Bennett, James T., and William P. Orzechowski. "The voting behavior of bureaucrats: Some empirical 
evidence." Public Choice 41, no. 2 (1983): 271-283. ; Bush, Winston C., and Arthur T. Denzau. "The voting 
behavior of bureaucrats and public sector growth." In Budgets and bureaucrats: The sources of government 
growth (1977): 90-99 ; and Gramlich, Edward M. and Daniel L. Rubinfeld. "Voting on public spending: 
Differences between public employees, transfer recipients, and private workers." Journal of Policy Analysis and 
Management 1, no. 4 (1982): 516-533 
6 
 
public employees.  This should cause either a shift of resources from department to 
department or an increase in total government expenditures necessitating a potentially larger 
burden on taxpayers. 
 
 Any increase in government expenditures can have potentially detrimental effects 
on the rest of society.19  Every dollar that used to support the work of public unions is a 
dollar that cannot be used elsewhere. If it is true that these unions are able to affect the 
demand of their jobs through political activity or the supply through collective bargaining 
processes then the level of spending as well as the supply of government jobs does not 
necessarily reflect a true market equilibrium point which could be characteristic of a 
misallocation of scarce resources. There is no truly competitive market for the jobs held by 
public workers. Within each geographical area, competition is not allowed, in most cases, 
between different public agencies and especially private firms to provide the services 
government departments provide. There is typically one fire department, one police 
department, one department of zoning, and one business license department (among many 
others). 
 
 Given this non-competitive market, the economic viability of government 
departments and bureaucracies is not necessarily threatened by, for instance, wage gains that 
exceed gains in worker marginal revenue product, which, in contrast, would inevitably cause 
private businesses to fail. The natural market test of profit and loss is not able to be carried 
out in publicly funded bureaucracies.20 The different institutional choices that can be made 
that govern how public employee unions are to be organized (i.e. collective bargaining) can 
ultimately have an effect on the government as a whole which are unchecked by typical 
market regulating processes. 
 
 There is no way for either taxpayers or the managers of these government 
bureaucracies to know if the services each agency renders are the best quality and offered at 
the cheapest price possible.21 Private sector unions have to take this into consideration, at 
least to some extent. If the demands they raise cause a firm to become uncompetitive in 
comparison to any other firm within the market, then there is a chance that their employer 
can go out of business, leaving the workers worse off than before. Consumers cannot be 
coerced to give a company their business, but taxpayers can. Any decrease in financial 
viability of government bureaucracies can ultimately result in “tax push” towards the 
taxpayers. 
 
 Given this, public sector collective bargaining has a clear advantage over their 
private sector counterparts.  They cannot create an inelastic demand for their work, but they 
can shift it outwards, as long as the “right” candidate is in office, and thereby shift taxpayer 
resources from being used to serve the interests of market participants towards instead 
serving their own self-interest. 
                                                          
19 See Rothbard, Murray Newton. Man, economy, and state. Princeton: van Nostrand, 1962. 
20 See Von Mises, Ludwig. Profit and loss. Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1951. 
21 See Hayek, Friedrich August. "The use of knowledge in society." The American economic 





 Within the literature there is a consensus that the presence of collective bargaining 
laws leads to increased union membership, political activity by public unions, artificial 
increases in labor demand, higher department budgets, and potentially increased wages as 
well as decreased employment in non-unionized departments. 
 
 There have been many studies that have empirically looked at the effect that public 
employee collective bargaining membership/coverage and/or the favorableness towards 
public unions of state specific laws has on wage, employment, and governmental budgets. 
Freeman and Valletta initially created the quantitative ranking of collective bargaining laws 
and found that increased favorableness to public unions lead to higher wages, higher 
collective bargain coverage, and potentially stagnant employment levels.22  Henry Farber 
found that public employee unions increased in membership in states where there were more 
favorable laws and that the relative increase of public employee unions compared with the 
decrease in private sector unions can be attributed to the non-competitive nature of the 
products and services provided by the public sector.23  
 
 Kevin O’Brien focused more on political activities of unions rather than simply 
relying on the possibility of having an increased ability to pressure politicians by the 
existence of favorable laws.24  He utilized proprietary data to examine different influential 
political techniques (these include candidate endorsement, financial contributions, and 
mismanagement disclosure threats, among others) used by fire and police unions in 1988.  
He found that collective bargaining laws are a necessary precondition for any of these to be 
effective and that the stronger the presence of public unions, the more they are able to shift 
the demand curve for their labor outward. 
 
 Jeffrey Zax and Casey Ichniowski also found that departmental employment and 
expenditures were increased by lobbying efforts of public unions, but this increase overall 
was offset by decreases in employment of non-unionized departments.25  They also found 
that lobbying for minimum staffing rules was a practical way that unions are able to 
artificially increase the demand for their labor. Similar studies have looked exclusively at 
police, teachers, and firefighters and also concluded that each specific sector gains benefits 
from the unionization of its employees. 26 
 
                                                          
22 Freeman, Richard B., and Robert Valletta. "The effects of public sector labor laws on labor market 
institutions and outcomes." In When public sector workers unionize, pp. 81-106. University of Chicago Press, 
1988. 
23 Farber op cite note 2 
24 O'Brien, Kevin M. "The impact of union political activities on public‐sector pay, employment, and budgets." 
Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society 33, no. 3 (1994): 322-345 
25 Zax, Jeffrey, and Casey Ichniowski. "The effects of public sector unionism on pay, employment, department 
budgets, and municipal expenditures." In When public sector workers unionize, pp. 323-364. University of 
Chicago Press, 1988. 
26Ashenfelter, Orley. "The effect of unionization on wages in the public sector: The case of fire fighters." 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review (1971): 191-202. 
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Marlow and Orzechowski, using cross-sectional data for the US from 1983-1985, 
determined that every 1% increase in union coverage rates led to a rise in per capita spending 
by state and local governments between $6.97 and $10.01, depending on the year.27 They 
also found that for every 1% increase in membership rates, average annual earnings for 
public employees increased by $70. Marlow did not find a statistically significant relationship 
between union membership rates and the number of FTE employees throughout the 
government.  
Marlow updated and slightly modified his past results using data from 2003-2010.  
He found that every 1% increase in union coverage rates the effect on state and local 
government spending increased to $38.39 per capita.28  He further found that the effect for 
wages was now $160.35 for every 1% increase in union membership and that there is a 
possibly sight increase in the number of FTE workers. 
 While the literature has established that different collective bargaining institutional 
choices and increased union membership/coverage rates have an effect across state 
expenditures, payrolls, and employment, none have looked at a time period as long as this 
analysis. This paper can be seen as a modification and extension of Marlow’s most recent 
studies. Increasing the time period can allow us to have a better understanding of the effects 
within and across states and if the effects have continued since the time these past studies 
were conducted. This study is also the first to explicitly look at the effect of compulsory vs. 
non-compulsory institutions as well as the effect of having all five possible functional job 
classes be compulsory at the same time as opposed to studying union membership or 
coverage rates. 
Description of Data 
Independent Variable of Interest 
 
 My independent variable of interest is the state and job specific collective 
bargaining scale value. The collective bargaining law scale is a ranking that quantitatively 
describes the qualitative favorableness of each type of state and job specific legislative 
environment towards public unions.  The variable is ranked 1-8 in increasing favorableness 
to unions: 
1. Collective bargaining prohibited. 
2. No provision 
3. Collective bargaining permitted, but not required 
4. Public employers are required to "meet and confer" with union leaders 
5. Public employers have a compulsory duty to bargain collectively, express or implied 
6. Collective bargaining is compulsory and third party mediation or fact finding is 
required 
7. Collective bargaining is compulsory and strikes are protected 
8. Collective bargaining is compulsory and arbitration is required 
                                                          
27 Marlow and Orzechowski op cite note 16 





 This was chosen as an independent variable in order to examine the effect 
increased favorableness has on increasing government expenditures. The ranking follows in 
the tradition of Freeman and Valetta's NBER ranking system, however it has been updated 
to include the new time series.29 
 
 I further break this ranking into two groups: compulsory and not compulsory (1 if 
compulsory and 0 if not) in an attempt to determine if the optional choice to make these 
laws compulsory has a greater effect. This is also used to address any potential criticisms that 
my model assumes a strictly linear relationship between the dependent variables and the 
collective bargaining law scale which may be unlikely. 
 
 While previous studies have chosen to focus on union coverage rates as a possible 
determinant of government spending, it is more appropriate to use the strength of collective-
bargaining laws as the main independent variable of interest.  By looking only at union 
density, previous studies have implied that a union's size alone determines how much 
influence it has in influencing policy and spending decisions. This would be true if we 
assume that policy choices are solely influenced by voting behavior. However, public-sector 
unions are able to exert their influence on policymakers because they can be granted powers 
not given to the public. These compulsory regulations enable them to compel government 
authorities to meet and confer with them through a collective bargaining process.  Because 
of this, the state-specific legal framework is a more suitable indicator of union power. 
 
 Further, concrete policy recommendations from the results of studies that focus 
on membership rates are difficult to make. One possible policy recommendation that can be 
made from a study that looks solely at membership rates is possibly a cap to membership 
rates that is most likely to lead to an optimal outcome. However this optimal rate may be 
dynamic within and across states which would cause an objective policy recommendation to 
be highly unlikely. The more interesting and potentially causal focused question to ask is, 
what enables the higher membership rates which influence the increased expenditures? As 
can be seen in the table below, union coverage/membership rates and the collective 
bargaining scale are highly correlated with one another.  
 
 By looking specifically at the institutions researchers have the opportunity to 
establish objective treatment periods which can lead to a clearer treatment effect and 
stronger case for identification. Due to this high correlation it is inappropriate to include 
both variables in the analysis and because of the objective treatment advantage, the more 







                                                          
29 Freeman and Valletta op cite note 22 
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Table 1 Collective Bargaining and Union Coverage Rates30 
CB Law Union Coverage of All Gov Employees 
1) Prohibited 17% 
2) No Provision 24% 
3) Permitted 27% 
4) Right to Meet and Confer 28% 
5) Duty to Bargain 63% 
6) Comp W/ FF or Med 51% 
7) Duty to Bargain w/ Strike 56% 
8) Duty to Bargain w/Arbitration 74% 
 
Along with the 1-8 scale of collective bargaining legislation I also include an ordinal scale of 
the state-specific strike laws for each class of government worker. The strike variable ranks 
from 1-3 and is also ranked on increasing favorableness to unions: 
 
1. Strikes expressly prohibited 
2. No legal provision 




 To determine the effect of stronger collective bargaining laws on various 
functional classes of government spending I utilize panel data from 1957-2011 broken up by 
state. In order to evaluate the impact of the legal environment of collective bargaining on 
government activities, the model must appropriately account for changes within the level of 
expenditures, payroll, and employment for other exogenous reasons.  While the level of 
government expenditures can be influenced by a vast number of variables the potentially 
relevant available control variables is severely limited because annual, state-level data that 
extends back to 1957 is difficult to obtain. Table 2 provides a description of the data and 
their sources. 
Table 2: Control Variables 
Variable Source 
Collective Bargaining Law NBER updated to 2011 
Right to Work*  Nevada Policy Research Institute 
Right to Strike  Nevada Policy Research Institute 
Democrat in Gov Office† Self Collected 
Per Capita Personal Income (2009$) BEA 
State Population US Census Bureau 
Welfare FTE Employees US Census Bureau 
*=1 if RTW, =0 otherwise            †=1 if Gov Democrat, =0 if otherwise 
 
                                                          
30 Table adapted from Farber op cite note 2 Table 4 pg. 21 
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 In all, the control variables that are included are: a 2 period lag of the log of state 
population, the log of personal disposable income, whether the state has right-to-work laws, 
the public sector union strike laws, the political party in power in the governor's office, the 
number of welfare FTE workers throughout the state, a time trend, and time squared. 
 
 Some useful relevant controls variables are unavailable due to data limitations of 
the relevant time frame are: unemployment rates, poverty rates, and racial and linguistic 
demographics.  Each of these variables could potentially influence government spending by 
increasing the demand for government services. However, due to the unavailability of data, I 
include the number of welfare full time equivalent (FTE) employees as a proxy for variations 
in the demand for government services which assumes that if a state has increased 
unemployment the number of welfare employees increases as well due to the increased 
demand on the welfare system, which should increase the demand for and supply of 
expanded government services.  This proxy is imperfect, greater employment in welfare 
divisions may not be correlated with true poverty metrics, but it is the best estimation 
available within the time period specified. 
 
 In order to control for the unobservable political nature of each state I include 
dummy variables that indicate whether a state is a right-to-work state as well as whether 
there is a Democrat in the governor’s office of each state. Right-to-work states tend to have 
smaller governments while states with Democrats in the Governor's office tend to exhibit 
expansions in the role of governments31. These two variables should allow for more 
appropriate estimates of the collective bargaining laws' effects on expenditures, employment, 
and wages because both can have an effect on the overall structure of government within a 
state at different times. 
 
 The log of per-capita disposable personal income is included to help account for 
individual state recessionary periods. The model assumes that during times of recessions, 
personal income should experience decreased growth rates. The model assumes that during 
times of recessions, the level of personal income should decrease. Since the model examines 
changes in levels of state government expenditures, number of FTE employees, and payrolls 
it is more appropriate to control for state-specific periods of recession rather than 
controlling for national recessionary periods. Further, the demand for government services 
may also be positively influenced by rising personal income.  High-income states, for 
instance, must offer higher wages for government employment due to the competitiveness 
of the labor market and relatively higher living costs.  Residents of high-income states may 
also demand a broader scope of government services.  Therefore, the level of in per-capita 
personal income is a necessary control variable. 
 
 The two-period lagged log of state population helps to control for a growing 
demand for infrastructure spending and other public services and also accounts for a 
growing tax base. This is lagged because government budgets and expenditures are relatively 
                                                          
31 This measure is, admittedly not perfect. The ideological leanings in Democrats and Republicans have 
changed over the course of this lengthy study period. This is especially evident in Southern Democrats who 
were much more conservative in the early years of the study. Different measures of political ideologies could be 
used in future studies. 
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non-dynamic and do not vary immediately with changes in population.  Generally, it takes 
time for the increased demands of population growth on infrastructure and other spending 
to become visible on state and local government budgets; therefore any population change in 
the current year is unlikely to influence the current year's budget. Also, current population 
levels are accounted for in the dependent variables by normalizing to per-capita levels. The 
choice to use a 2 year lag rather than other possible lag periods is due to the practical fact 
that some states do not set budgets on an annual basis, and statistical tests showed longer 
lags are insignificant at accounting for variations in the dependent variables. 
 
 The previous literature suggests that there may be other control variables that 
should be considered relevant, however they have been omitted for varying reasons.  For 
example, previous studies have controlled for: regional factors (such as whether the state is 
in the South), population density, and the overall state and local tax burden. 
 
 Concerning the regional factors, these largely remain constant through time and 
are therefore appropriately accounted for by the fixed effects estimator. Previous studies 
separated Southern states from the rest of the analysis due to a perceived “anti-union” 
cultural attitude.  This may be useful if union density is selected as the independent variable.  
However, the data-set shows that the legal environment for public-sector collective 
bargaining varies greatly throughout the country, including across southern states. 
 
 Previous studies have analyzed whether population density affects the size of 
government.  However, while this variable might be appropriate when comparing municipal 
expenditures, we believe it only confuses the results when applied at the state level.  As a 
group, the Western states are less densely populated that the Eastern states, for example, but 
several Western states still display relatively high government spending compared to Eastern 
States.  The choice to exclude this variable is validated by counter-intuitive results found by 
previous studies that have included population density as a control variable.32 It is also 
unnecessary to adjust for differences in the cost of living across states because this difference 
is accounted for within the fixed-effects estimator and is also implicit, to some extent, within 
the personal income per capita variable which partially accounts for the demand side of 
living costs. 
 
 Finally, it is improper to use the tax burden as a control variable when spending is 
the dependent variable: forty-nine states have a balanced budget requirement (Vermont is 
the exception) that restricts state-level spending to the amount of available revenue.  Because 
of this, including a measurement of the tax burden does not indicate anything of interest due 
to the nature of the relationship between expenditures and the tax burden being almost 




For the analysis within this paper I used different functional job classifications of real 
government spending, FTE employees, and payroll all normalized by state population (the 
                                                          
32 Marlow op cite note 28 
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average earnings are defined as the average monthly earnings for employees within the 
selected category). In all, my variables range from: Total, State, Local, and Specific 
Department (police, fire, teachers, and other) spending, payrolls, and employment. These 
data are obtained from the Census Bureau’s Annual Survey of State and Local Government 
Finance.33 This annual survey began in 1977, and is merged with the Census of Governments 
survey starting in 1957.  For non-survey years during the 1957-1977 period, the Census 
Bureau provides estimates of annual values. For the missing observations that still remain, 
context based averages have been inserted. This dataset provides a time series that covers the 
before and after period of all state-level collective bargaining laws. Tables 3-5display the 
summary statistics of my dependent variables. 
Table 3 Spending Summary Stats 
VARIABLES N mean sd min max 
K-12 Spending 2,750 1,080 492.4 0† 3,379 
Police Spending 2,750 144.3 84.55 0† 480.4 
Fire Spending 2,750 62.77 40.72 0† 423.3 
Total Spending 2,750 5,150 2,794 1,017 20,830 
State Spending 2,750 3,316 2,068 0† 16,099 
Local Spending 2,750 2,687 1,368 0† 9,230 
Other Spending 2,750 1,399 860.6 -819.5† 5,807 
Number of groups 50 50 50 50 50 
†The 0 and negative values are for Alaska and Hawaii before they became states 
 
 
Table 4 FTE Employment Summary Stats34 
VARIABLES N mean sd min max 
State Total FTE 2,746 0.0157 0.00625 0.00500 0.0459 
State Edu FTE 2,746 0.00589 0.00346 0.000461 0.0289 
State Police FTE 2,746 0.000345 0.000177 0† 0.00150 
Local FTE 2,750 0.0325 0.00779 0.00629 0.0683 
Local K-12 FTE 2,750 0.0190 0.00533 0† 0.0381 
Local Police FTE 2,750 0.00203 0.000650 0.000380 0.00440 
Local Fire FTE 2,750 0.000924 0.000365 1.26e-05 0.00273 
Tot. Gov FTE 2,750 0.0482 0.0105 0.0184 0.0927 
Tot. K-12 FTE 2,750 0.0249 0.00626 0.00901 0.0454 
Tot. Gov Police FTE 2,750 0.00237 0.000684 0.000887 0.00523 
Tot. Gov Fire FTE 2,750 0.000924 0.000364 1.26e-05 0.00273 
Total Other FTE 2,750 0.00122 0.000502 0.000454 0.00476 
 
 
                                                          
33 U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau, “Annual Survey of State & Local Government 
Finance,” https://www.census.gov/govs/local/. 
34 These are presented in per capita for ease of comparing to other results 
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Table 5 Payrolls Summary Stats35 
VARIABLES N mean sd min max 
State Payrolls Per Cap 2,746 51.24 27.54 8.800 216.6 
State Edu Payrolls Per Cap 2,746 20.70 13.33 1.074 114.4 
State Police Payrolls Per Cap 2,746 1.301 0.933 0† 7.088 
State AvgEarnings All 2,448 3,365 765.2 1,418 5,924 
Local Tot. Payrolls Per Cap 2,750 98.95 39.18 9.012 266.3 
Local K12 Payrolls Per Cap 2,750 58.27 22.61 0† 146.3 
Local Police Payrolls Per Cap 2,750 7.082 4.006 1.017 30.47 
Local Fire Payrolls Per Cap 2,750 3.476 1.995 0.0375 13.30 
Local Avg Earnings All 2,452 3,150 762.4 1,251 5,770 
Tot. Gov Payrolls Per Cap 2,750 150.1 57.88 34.21 420.3 
Tot. K-12 Payrolls Per Cap 2,750 78.97 28.83 18.49 184.5 
Tot. Gov Police Payrolls Per Cap 2,750 8.378 4.444 1.411 32.48 
Tot. Gov. Fire Payrolls Per Cap 2,750 3.474 1.991 0.0375 13.30 




 I estimate the relationship between the level of government spending and the level 
of public sector collective bargaining through the following OLS model: 
 
 𝑌𝑖𝑘𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖𝑘𝑡𝐶𝐵 𝐿𝑎𝑤 + 𝛽𝑿 + 𝜺𝒊𝒌𝒕                        ( 1 ) 
 
 Where Y is the level of per-capita real government spending (2009$), FTE 
employees, and payrolls in state i at time t and sector k (Total, State, Local, etc.). γ is the 
effect of the collective bargaining institution in place of state i at time t for sector k. X is a 
vector of the control variables and ε is the error term. αi is a dummy denoting state fixed 
effects estimates. 
 
 By including a fixed effects estimator, the model controls for unmeasured but time 
invariant differences across states, such as differing cultural or ideological viewpoints.  The 
fixed-effect coefficients help reduce the possibility of omitted variable bias within the 
regression and allow for more correctly identified estimates of the effect these different 
collective bargaining legislative arrangements may have on the dependent variables of 
interest. 
 
 Using a fixed effects model, however, introduces other potential complications. 
Introducing a fixed-effects estimator may bias the model's ability to measure differences 
across states and restrict its usefulness to measuring differences within states over time 
                                                          
35 These data are also presented per capita. Initially it was considered to use a per fte employment basis, 




because variation within the dependent variables becomes too heavily attributed to state 
fixed effects. It is possible that the fixed effect estimator could account for too much 
variation within the dependent variables and bias the estimates. To address these concerns, I 
provide results without fixed effects and with the Driscoll-Kraay robust standard errors, 
which should provide support that the model is correctly identified. 
 
 In order to determine the robustness of my results the model was run in 4 ways: 
Panel OLS with and without state fixed effects and Panel Pooled OLS/WLS that 
incorporates Driscoll and Kraay robust standard errors with and without state fixed effects. 
 
 Driscoll and Kraay standard errors are intended to be used with Panel Data that 
has both a large number of panels as well as a long time series which exhibits cross-sectional 
dependence where the error terms are correlated.  Chudik and Pesaran note that “[c]ross 
correlations of errors could be due to omitted common effects, spatial effects, or could arise 
as a result of interactions within socioeconomic networks. Conventional panel estimators 
such as fixed or random effects can result in misleading inference and even inconsistent 
estimators, depending on the extent of cross-sectional dependence and on whether the 
source generating the cross-sectional dependence (such as an unobserved common shock) is 
correlated with regressors.”36 The regressions are estimated both with and without state fixed 
effects to provide more generalizable results to demonstrate the causal effect across panels 
rather than strictly within. This was also done in order to demonstrate that the variation in 
the dependent variables was not fully accounted for by the fixed effects estimators, therefore 
improving the case for an identified relationship between the dependent variables and the 
main independent variable: the collective bargaining legislation within each state. 
Selected Results 
 
 A discussion of the results for the regressions that examine collective bargaining 
laws for state employees is presented below. The results for the other four functional 
classifications of state and local government employees are presented in Appendix A. 
Overall, the results are very similar and an effort has been made to point out any 




 Collective Bargaining laws seem to have a pronounced effect on government 
spending both at the state and total government level. The table below provides the results 
for state and total government expenditures regressed on the NBER collective bargaining 1-
8 scale variable. In both cases we see positive and statistically significant results at the 1% 
level (p < 0.01) for both models with and without fixed effects. For every increase in the 
collective bargaining scale per-capita state expenditures increase by $88.79-100.1 and per-
capita total government expenditures increase by $104.1-125.1. As an example, if state 
decided to move from a prohibition on collective bargaining (1) to compulsory bargaining 
                                                          
36 Chudik, Alexander, and M. Pesaran. "Large panel data models with cross-sectional dependence: a survey." 
CAFE Research Paper 13.15 (2013) 
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with arbitration required for state employees (8) then the per capita costs of state 
government should be expected to rise by $621.53-713.30. 
 
 However, concerns have been raised as to the validity of using a 1-8 linear scale 
because it is highly unlikely that the effects on government spending increase linearly, and 
instead different movements along the scale should presumably produce non-linear effects. 
Results from the compulsory vs non-compulsory dummy variable are presented below. As 
can be seen in the table, we see a similar, yet much stronger result. For every state that has 
compulsory collective bargaining laws (CB ≥ 5) per-capita state government expenditures 
increase by $441.5-491.1 and per-capita total government expenditures increase by $546.0-
653.5 (both results are significant at the 1% level).37 
 
 It is clear that the compulsory laws have the most pronounced effect on 
government expenditures, which is what is expected. By forcing employers—publicly elected 
or appointed bureaucrats—to meet and confer and in some cases accept the findings of 
outside arbiters they are incentivized to more easily be swayed by public sector employees’ 
demands at increased funding rather than allow disputes to go through a monetarily costly 
formal system that also reduces the time spent providing public sector services. 
 
 It is interesting to note a slight divergence from traditional theory that is found in 
these results. Traditionally it has been expected that government employee unions that are 
unionized will increase their department's expenditures by influencing decision makers to 
reallocate resources from other departments. However, we see that both state and total 
expenditures are increased unequally. If the public sector unions were only capable of 
causing a shift in government resources then we should expect to see a positive effect on the 
department but then no effect on total government expenditures. Another case would be 
that they are only interested in increasing their department's budget. In this case the unions 
would not look for a reallocation of resources necessarily, but an overall expansion of 
government expenditures towards their department. In this case we would expect to see a 
positive effect on both the state department budget as well as a positive and potentially equal 
but not greater effect on total expenditures. This would be due to the state employees 
lobbying for an expansion in their sector either wholly funded by a government expansion 
(in this case we should see an increase in total government expenditures equal to the increase 
in the state department) or partially funded by an increase in spending as well as a 
reallocation of resources from other departments (in this case we would expect the effect to 
on total expenditures to be positive but not as great as the increase in the department). 
However, since we see a greater effect on total expenditures it seems that in general these 
laws cause an overall expansion in government expenditures across the board rather than 
specific to that one sector. 
                                                          
37 These results are generally representative for the other 4 functional classes of government employees, with a 
few exceptions. Collective bargaining for firefighters and police do not have as strong of an effect at the 
departmental level and K-12 teachers do not have any effect on departmental or local spending (see Appendix 
A). The teachers can be easily explained given that spending on education has increased dramatically across 
every state over the study period because of federal grants. This general increase occurs regardless of the local 
institutions and therefore the data is unable to find an effect from the institutional law variables. 






Table 6 Total and State Spending Results 


















                  
CB State 125.1*** 104.4*** 88.79*** 100.1*** — — — — 
 (14.10) (19.09) (14.35) (16.03) — — — — 
State Compulsory — — — — 653.5*** 546.0*** 441.5*** 491.1*** 
 — — — — (77.23) (109.9) (72.06) (84.72) 
State Strike 504.5*** 150.4*** 431.0*** 118.4*** 516.7*** 156.2*** 439.3*** 124.9*** 
 (41.36) (29.18) (33.59) (31.84) (39.72) (27.59) (32.71) (32.19) 
Right to Work 124.5** -242.4 -250.3*** -219.5* 130.6** -207.3 -254.0*** -197.5 
 (53.07) (152.3) (67.16) (117.3) (55.45) (162.7) (70.45) (122.5) 
Dem in Gov. 
Office 76.34 42.73 61.78 25.97 59.43 36.39 49.33 21.09 
 (74.31) (42.42) (61.27) (31.77) (73.55) (42.11) (61.07) (31.58) 
Time -68.83*** 57.20** -24.23 42.39* -68.32*** 54.75** -23.51 41.92* 
 (19.40) (24.81) (15.89) (21.23) (18.58) (24.55) (15.51) (21.13) 
Time2 1.994*** 1.460*** 1.313*** 1.105*** 2.001*** 1.485*** 1.310*** 1.112*** 
 (0.166) (0.175) (0.138) (0.161) (0.162) (0.174) (0.135) (0.161) 
Ln(Per Cap 
Income) 4,236*** 127.7 2,274*** -164.6 4,193*** 180.2 2,259*** -135.1 
 (581.3) (676.7) (452.2) (547.6) (564.3) (672.8) (445.6) (547.4) 
Lag ln(State Pop) -1.26e-05* -5.65e-06 -5.04e-05*** -7.44e-05*** -1.74e-05*** -1.82e-05** -5.39e-05*** -8.61e-05*** 
 (6.40e-06) (8.40e-06) (3.99e-06) (8.15e-06) (5.46e-06) (8.73e-06) (3.48e-06) (8.12e-06) 
Total Welfare FTE 0.00385*** 0.00657* -0.00209** 0.00622 0.00242*** 0.00607* -0.00313*** 0.00565 
 (0.000678) (0.00344) (0.000867) (0.00415) (0.000607) (0.00334) (0.000868) (0.00415) 
Constant -38,850*** 165.7 -20,901*** 2,441 -38,180*** -71.87 -20,562*** 2,401 
 (5,429) (6,288) (4,192) (5,058) (5,301) (6,262) (4,162) (5,065) 
Observations 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 
R-squared 0.795 0.919 0.720 0.884 0.796 0.920 0.720 0.885 
Number of groups 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 




 Admittedly, this could also be attributed to the fact that in many cases the 
collective bargaining laws for one sector are highly correlated with the laws from other 
sectors. Simply looking at a change within one sector's laws at one time ignores the other job 
classification's bargaining powers changing as well which is not always likely due to each 
sector being highly correlated with increases in the other sectors (corr. ~0.70+). This 
possibility is further discussed and addressed below. 
 
State FTE employment and State Payrolls 
 
 While the results for spending seem to clearly indicate an increase in collective 
bargaining powers to state employee unions is related with an expansion in government 
expenditures the case for full-time equivalent employees (FTE) is not as clear. The table 
below shows that for every increase along the NBER collective bargaining scale the total 
number of FTE employed by state governments increase by 1.15-2.83 employees per 10,000 
population (p < 0.01). This small increase in the number of public sector employees does 
not seem to fully account for the increase in government expenditures. Similar but slightly 
larger results are found using the compulsory dummy variable specification. In this case state 
total FTE employment increases by 4.78-7.62 per 10,000 people, but this increase does not 
seem to keep pace with the increase in government expenditures. If the increase in 
expenditures was going towards increasing employment, and potentially increasing the 
availability of government services for taxpayers each new employee that was hired would 
need to be paid $644,488.19 ([491.1*10000]/7.62) which is a highly unlikely amount. 
 
 A similar result to FTE employment is found for payrolls as well. As seen in the 
table below real state payrolls increase by $1.187-1.288 per-capita (p < 0.01), $11,870-12,880 
per 10,000 people, for each level increase on the NBER scale. The alternate dummy variable 
model provides an effect of $5.09-5.13 per-capita for those state's with compulsory collective 
bargaining laws for state employees. Again, the increase in payrolls does not seem to tell the 
whole story. It is important to note that payrolls do not reflect benefits such as health-care 
or retirement pension plans. Because of this, focusing on payrolls can provide us with a 
downward bias on the amount government employees are actually benefiting as a result of 
these collective bargaining laws, however due to data restrictions this is the best 
approximation that can be made. 
 
 These results indicate that government spending is undoubtedly increasing, but it 
cannot wholly be attributed to increases in government FTE employment or total payrolls. A 
likely explanation of this is that the expenditures are going towards facilities or other 
departmental perks, such as new equipment, or possibly the money could be spent on a 
growing number of deferred benefits and unfunded liabilities such as increased health-care 
or pension plans. If government spending is being used on employee pension plans and 
other unfunded liabilities as a result of these collective bargaining laws then serious 
consideration must be made as to the efficacy of these laws being used to cause governments 
to engage in what can be seen as “riskier” spending practices.38 
                                                          
38 See Appendix A for similar results found from the other government employee functional classes. 
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Table 7 Employment and Payroll Results 


















                  
CB State 0.000283*** 0.000151*** 1.288*** 1.187*** — — — — 
 (2.82e-05) (3.58e-05) (0.188) (0.245) — — — — 
State Compulsory — — — — 0.000762*** 0.000478*** 5.132*** 5.090*** 
 — — — — (0.000150) (0.000150) (0.986) (1.000) 
State Strike 0.00134*** -0.000117 6.514*** -0.330 0.00136*** -9.95e-05 6.613*** -0.232 
 (9.50e-05) (7.92e-05) (0.537) (0.522) (9.25e-05) (8.50e-05) (0.533) (0.554) 
Right to Work -0.000128 -0.000106 -1.489* -2.144** -0.000369** -0.000166 -1.993** -2.143** 
 (0.000148) (0.000326) (0.760) (0.814) (0.000157) (0.000324) (0.867) (0.829) 
Dem in Gov Office 0.000346 -0.000129 1.250 -0.272 0.000294 -0.000126 1.045 -0.303 
 (0.000364) (0.000115) (1.527) (0.538) (0.000354) (0.000115) (1.508) (0.534) 
Time 0.000406*** 0.000479*** 0.278 1.047*** 0.000419*** 0.000494*** 0.309 1.084*** 
 (4.63e-05) (5.25e-05) (0.241) (0.298) (4.64e-05) (5.48e-05) (0.238) (0.311) 
Time2 -5.93e-06*** -6.20e-06*** -0.0069*** -0.0095*** -6.15e-06*** -6.33e-06*** -0.0074*** -0.0098*** 
 (4.95e-07) (5.36e-07) (0.00235) (0.00247) (5.00e-07) (5.48e-07) (0.00233) (0.00255) 
Ln(Per Cap Income) 0.00513*** 0.00193 50.78*** 22.04*** 0.00550*** 0.00181 51.38*** 21.92*** 
 (0.00129) (0.00117) (6.513) (7.629) (0.00127) (0.00121) (6.547) (7.828) 
Lag ln(State Pop) -5.73e-10*** -3.79e-10*** -1.8e-06*** -1.5e-06*** -5.86e-10*** -3.94e-10*** -1.9e-06*** -1.7e-06*** 
 (0) (0) (8.29e-08) (1.01e-07) (0) (5.06e-11) (7.24e-08) (1.12e-07) 
All Gov Welfare 
FTE -3.55e-08*** -5.79e-11 -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -3.94e-08*** -1.66e-09 -0.0001*** -0.0001*** 
 (1.95e-09) (7.43e-09) (8.42e-06) (2.74e-05) (1.68e-09) (7.39e-09) (8.70e-06) (2.74e-05) 
Constant -0.0415*** -0.00927 -465.2*** -184.8** -0.0443*** -0.00783 -468.0*** -181.1** 
 (0.0120) (0.0109) (60.44) (70.39) (0.0119) (0.0113) (61.15) (72.53) 
Observations 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 
R-squared 0.482 0.729 0.563 0.798 0.476 0.728 0.560 0.798 
Number of groups 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 






 A number of robustness checks were used to confirm the validity of the results 
and confirm identification. One criticism that was previously mentioned was that simply 
testing one of the laws at a time ignored the fact that many of these laws can be in effect at 
the same time and that the combination of these laws could be biasing the effects found in 
the above results tables. To initially test the effect of different combinations of the possible 
compulsory bargaining laws, I created an “All Compulsory” variable, which equaled 1 if a 
state had every possible compulsory collective bargaining law in effect and a “Total 
Compulsory” variable that measured the total number of compulsory laws in effect within a 
state at a given time (this value could range from 1 to 5).  I included these variables as an 
attempt to establish a simple, potentially uniform treatment effect across the states. These 
variables allow for a better understanding of the effect of a “shock” wherein every possible 
policy intervention is exercised. 
 
 “Total Compulsory” attempts to measure the effect different amounts of these 
laws may have within and across states. Table 7 and 8 provide the results from using the 
Total Compulsory variable as the primary variable of interest. FTE employment and Payrolls 
are generally unaffected which is consistent from the previous findings. The effect on Total 
Spending is also consistent with the previous findings, although it admittedly is much less 
than the State Compulsory results. In this case we see an increase in total expenditures by 
$123.6-137.0 per capita for each compulsory collective bargaining law within a state.  
 
 Previous estimates that use State Compulsory assumed that the only compulsory 
law in effect was for State workers, however this is likely not to be the case given how highly 
correlated each of the laws are with one another. By using Total Compulsory we can look 
explicitly at what the effect of having one compulsory law is, however we have no control 
over which laws are being accounted for. This scale then assumes that each law has an equal 
effect on expenditures which is also unlikely and not supported by the findings presented in 
Appendix A. Because of the limitations of this scale, “All Compulsory” may provide us with 







Table 8 Total Number of Compulsory Laws on Employment and Payroll 
   FE  FE 
VARIABLES Tot. Gov FTE Tot. Gov FTE Tot. Gov Payrolls Tot. Gov Payrolls 
Total Comp. Laws -0.000189** 7.90e-05 1.513*** 2.389*** 
 (7.22e-05) (0.000124) (0.480) (0.546) 
Right to Work 0.00266*** 0.00131* 1.592 -3.379 
 (0.000209) (0.000750) (1.035) (2.926) 
Dem in Gov Office 0.000147 -6.59e-05 1.042 0.00182 
 (0.000423) (0.000230) (1.602) (1.033) 
Time 0.000889*** 0.000729*** -0.365 1.358* 
 (9.63e-05) (0.000141) (0.587) (0.788) 
Time2 -1.12e-05*** -9.91e-06*** -4.32e-05 -0.00635 
 (1.30e-06) (1.52e-06) (0.00554) (0.00663) 
Ln(Per Cap Income) 0.0110*** 0.0138*** 135.3*** 75.85*** 
 (0.00215) (0.00276) (14.43) (18.10) 
Lag ln(State Pop) -3.75e-10*** -5.98e-10*** -3.93e-07*** -8.35e-07*** 
 (0) (0) (1.29e-07) (2.07e-07) 
All Gov Welfare FTE 1.39e-08 1.05e-07*** -0.000101*** -6.84e-05 
 (1.13e-08) (3.39e-08) (2.23e-05) (8.78e-05) 
Constant -0.0743*** -0.0988*** -1,199*** -641.9*** 
 (0.0200) (0.0254) (132.3) (165.9) 
Observations 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 
R-squared 0.650 0.853 0.765 0.900 
Number of groups 50 50 50 50 





Table 9 Total Number of Compulsory Laws on Spending 














No. of Comp. 
Laws 137.0*** 123.6*** 93.14*** 108.6*** 55.92*** 44.96*** 
 (19.13) (23.44) (17.04) (20.74) (6.979) (9.696) 
Right to Work -43.27 -210.7 -396.3*** -206.1 357.0*** 9.009 
 (56.87) (166.8) (79.57) (130.1) (35.64) (98.87) 
Dem in Gov 
Office 80.01 38.25 66.95 22.82 39.97 48.21** 
 (75.12) (42.50) (61.90) (32.04) (43.57) (23.60) 
Time -77.31*** 48.87* -30.97** 37.34* -39.55*** 14.36 
 (17.21) (25.09) (14.59) (21.63) (10.02) (15.23) 
Time2 2.169*** 1.584*** 1.446*** 1.190*** 0.810*** 0.531*** 
 (0.143) (0.177) (0.117) (0.160) (0.0813) (0.103) 
Ln(Per Cap 
Income) 4,070*** 117.6 2,165*** -186.6 2,332*** 739.8* 
 (560.7) (665.7) (455.7) (550.6) (284.3) (412.4) 




05*** 5.24e-05*** 7.61e-05*** 
 (7.03e-06) (9.57e-06) (4.24e-06) (8.03e-06) (5.87e-06) (7.12e-06) 
All Gov Welfare 
FTE 0.00164** 0.00524 -0.003*** 0.00476 0.0075*** 0.00401* 
 (0.000629) (0.00329) (0.00116) (0.00401) (0.000370) (0.00206) 
Constant -36,011*** 807.8 -18,818*** 3,116 -21,034*** -6,201 
 (5,222) (6,176) (4,220) (5,092) (2,663) (3,821) 
Observations 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 
R-squared 0.780 0.919 0.699 0.883 0.759 0.893 
Number of 
groups 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 All Compulsory” provides us with estimates of the differences between the most 
“pro”-union states (those with compulsory bargaining powers granted to all five employee 
classes) and the rest of the country. By using this measurement we can create a more 
transparent and definitive treatment effect.  As can be seen in Table 9 if a state has all five 
possible compulsory laws in effect total government expenditures increase by $457-595.1 per 
capita. This finding is very similar to the previous results that looked at state workers’ laws 
individually. We also see an increase at the state and local levels as well. Also similar to 
previous results is the effect, or general lack thereof, on both FTE employment and Payrolls 
as seen in Table 10. 
 




                       Table 10 All Compulsory on Spending 
    FE   FE   FE 
VARIABLES Total Spending Total Spending State Spending State Spending Local Spending Local Spending 
All Comp. 595.1*** 457.0*** 449.2*** 441.4*** 160.3*** 94.68* 
 (126.0) (134.8) (108.9) (112.8) (39.02) (48.72) 
1 if All Strikes >2 3,522*** 1,395* 3,165*** 1,098* 1,145*** 898.1*** 
 (985.1) (731.1) (859.6) (652.0) (363.5) (294.2) 
Right to Work -0.227 -201.4 -340.6*** -185.8 343.5*** -7.254 
 (45.66) (166.7) (64.85) (130.7) (37.37) (98.20) 
Dem in Gov Office 98.45 40.32 84.53 23.14 44.19 51.47** 
 (69.48) (41.06) (54.32) (32.11) (41.99) (21.04) 
Time -74.74*** 65.40*** -30.13** 49.46** -37.30*** 25.03* 
 (17.02) (23.38) (13.77) (20.09) (10.56) (13.98) 
Time2 2.231*** 1.486*** 1.536*** 1.118*** 0.799*** 0.476*** 
 (0.165) (0.177) (0.146) (0.163) (0.0895) (0.0981) 
Ln(Per Cap Income) 3,839*** -270.8 1,900*** -477.2 2,318*** 477.3 
 (425.8) (606.8) (292.6) (493.5) (263.6) (374.0) 
Lag ln(State Pop) -2.26e-05*** -2.05e-05** -5.79e-05*** -8.79e-05*** 5.27e-05*** 7.54e-05*** 
 (5.35e-06) (8.13e-06) (3.86e-06) (8.43e-06) (5.16e-06) (5.96e-06) 
All Gov Welfare FTE 0.00134* 0.00677** -0.00394*** 0.00603 0.00745*** 0.00477** 
 (0.000694) (0.00304) (0.00130) (0.00381) (0.000341) (0.00194) 
Constant -33,814*** 4,432 -16,316*** 5,832 -20,903*** -3,755 
 (3,940) (5,594) (2,670) (4,529) (2,463) (3,448) 
Observations 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 
R-squared 0.808 0.923 0.741 0.889 0.769 0.899 
Number of groups 50 50 50 50 50 50 




    
Table 11 All Compulsory on Employment and Wages 
    FE   FE 
VARIABLES Tot. Gov FTE Tot. Gov FTE Tot. Gov Payrolls Tot. Gov Payrolls 
All Comp. -0.000904*** -8.09e-05 5.588** 6.295** 
 (0.000263) (0.000321) (2.588) (2.428) 
1 if All Strikes >2 0.0106*** 0.00450** 74.88*** 38.79*** 
 (0.00224) (0.00179) (17.73) (10.66) 
Right to Work 0.00282*** 0.00124 2.325*** -3.922 
 (0.000200) (0.000780) (0.777) (2.739) 
Dem in Gov Office 0.000202 -5.34e-05 1.417 0.133 
 (0.000443) (0.000233) (1.516) (0.997) 
Time 0.000880*** 0.000768*** -0.339 1.838** 
 (8.78e-05) (0.000139) (0.583) (0.754) 
Time2 -1.06e-05*** -1.00e-05*** 0.00202 -0.00898 
 (1.34e-06) (1.52e-06) (0.00611) (0.00673) 
Ln(Per Cap Income) 0.00976*** 0.0126*** 129.6*** 64.42*** 
 (0.00171) (0.00284) (11.37) (16.54) 
Lag ln(State Pop) -3.66e-10*** -5.99e-10*** -3.48e-07*** -8.74e-07*** 
 (0) (0) (8.99e-08) (1.55e-07) 
All Gov Welfare FTE 1.32e-08 1.08e-07*** -0.000107*** -3.25e-05 
 (1.08e-08) (3.42e-08) (2.26e-05) (8.38e-05) 
Constant -0.0629*** -0.0879*** -1,146*** -535.5*** 
  (0.0159) (0.0261) (103.1) (150.5) 
Observations 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 
R-squared 0.667 0.856 0.793 0.906 
Number of groups 50 50 50 50 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 While neither Total Compulsory nor All Compulsory provide not perfect estimates 
of the treatment effect, the estimates from the All Compulsory regressions should indicate 
the most unbiased treatment effect that can be obtained in this situation given the data 
constraints and lack of a well-behaved natural experiment with a uniform treatment period 
across all entities 
 
 The ideal study would have had a set of control states and a set of treated states 
who mimic one another in precisely the same way in the pre-treatment period and it would 
have a treatment given in the same manner and at the same time to each of the treatment 
states. This research design would have provided a truly unbiased treatment effect when the 
results of the two groups were compared and contrasted with one another after the 
treatment period. However, the real world has not provided this kind natural experiment to 
analyze.  So I attempted to show that our results hold up when such a natural experiment is 
created using the synthetic control method.  
 
 The synthetic control method is primarily used for comparative case studies and is 
useful when there are a small number of relevant treatment groups. Since collective 
bargaining laws can be passed independently of one another and at different times both 
within and across states it is difficult to define a relevant treatment and control group as well 
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as an objective treatment period. However, the synthetic control method uses a data-driven 
procedure to create a best-matched counterfactual from among a group of control states that 
accurately mimics the treated state in the time period prior to treatment. The method 
compares the observed, actual dependent variable data (spending, employment, or wages) in 
the post treatment period with the created, unobserved synthetic control observations from 
the best-matched group of control states, in an attempt to provide a relevant counterfactual 
to understand what effect the treatment (policy change) had overall on the treated state. 39 
 
 For the purposes of this analysis, the best possible case where we can have a 
clearly established control and treatment group is the instance where a state passes 
requirements for compulsory collective bargaining for all five employee classes 
simultaneously.  These instances allow us to compare the experience of the treated state to a 
control group made up of states that have either never been treated by any compulsory laws 
or have never had more than 2 compulsory collective bargaining laws at a time. I attempted 
to use a control group made up of only states never exposed to compulsory collective 
bargaining laws, but I was unable to make relevant synthetic control matches for any of the 
10 treatment states using this limited sample. Because of this I expanded my control states to 
include those states who have less than a majority of their laws as compulsory (≤ 2). The 
complete list of control states and the number of compulsory collective bargaining laws each 
has can be found below. 
 
Table 12 List of Control States and Compulsory Laws 
Alabama 0 Georgia 1 
Arizona 0 Indiana 1 
Arkansas 0 Kansas 1 
Louisiana 0 Missouri 1 
Mississippi 0 North Dakota 1 
North Carolina 0 Tennessee 1 
South Carolina 0 Utah 1 
Virginia 0 Wyoming 1 
West Virginia 0 Idaho 2 
Texas 0 Kentucky 2 
 Colorado 1 Maryland 2 
                                                          
39 See Abadie, Alberto, Alexis Diamond, and Jens Hainmueller. "Synthetic control methods for comparative 
case studies: Estimating the effect of California’s tobacco control program." Journal of the American Statistical 
Association 105, no. 490 (2010) for a mathematical and theoretical explanation of the processes underlying the 
synthetic control approach. Also see: Coffman, Makena, and Ilan Noy. "Hurricane Iniki: measuring the long-
term economic impact of a natural disaster using synthetic control." Environment and Development 
Economics 17, no. 02 (2012): 187-205.; Eren, Ozkan, and I. Serkan Ozbeklik. "Right-to-Work Laws and State-
Level Economic Outcomes: Evidence from the Case Studies of Idaho and Oklahoma Using Synthetic Control 
Method." unpublished manuscript: 2012. 
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 In total, there are 10 states that passed compulsory laws for all five employee 
groups at the same time: New York (1968), Washington (1968), New Jersey (1969), Oregon 
(1970), Hawaii (1971), South Dakota (1971), Minnesota (1973), Montana (1974), Florida 
(1976), and Ohio (1985). Among these ten states, I was able to create four successful 
synthetic control matches that accurately reflect the traits of the treated units in the pre-
treatment period (the synthetic control method depends on an accurate representation in the 
pre-treatment period in order for the results to be relevant). While the choice of states may 
be questioned, ultimately the data-driven procedure of the synthetic control method 
statistically determined whether a state was a good candidate for matching and analysis. 
 
 The other six states were not able to create a statistically representative match with 
the available pool of control states. When tested, the six states produced root squared mean 
prediction errors (RSMPEs) ranging from 2 to 7 times higher than the best fitting model, 
New Jersey. The goal of the synthetic control method is to reduce the RSMPE as much as 
possible in order to provide the best match with the data possible. Unfortunately, our 
available control group is not an adequate match for all of our treated states.   Each 
statistically significant case provides evidence that compulsory collective bargaining laws 
have resulted in higher government spending. 
 
 South Dakota provided an interesting case. Initial synthetic control estimates 
showed results that countered the study's main findings — the synthetic, non-treated South 
Dakota’s total spending levels were higher than the actual treated South Dakota. However, 
after conducting placebo tests to check the accuracy of the results, it was found that the 
initial result is not statistically significant because many of the placebo tests reported a 
treatment effect larger than what was found. 
 
 Results for these four case studies (Ohio, New York, South Dakota, and New 
Jersey) are provided below.  While evidence from the case-study approach is not 
comprehensive, the results from the four available case studies do confirm the overall 
finding that compulsory powers for public-sector unions leads to higher government 
spending. 
 
 Provided below are the weight assignments for each synthetic control match, a 
table providing an explanation as to how well the synthetic control unit approximates the 
treated unit's performance in the pre-treated period, a graphical representation of the treated 
observed data compared to the unobserved synthetic control result, and a graph providing a 
placebo test. 
 
 Table 12 provides the weights attributed to the different control states. We can see 
that in many of the cases we do not find a relevant enough comparison and therefore assign 
a weight of 0 to the states that do not represent a viable control option. This data-driven 
technique allows for an unbiased assignment of control states. It is important to note that 
only one of the states that was matched has 0 compulsory laws (Texas). The other best 
matching states have between 1-2 compulsory public sector collective bargaining laws. 
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Because of this we are still unable to establish a completely transparent treatment effect from 




Table 13 State Weights for Synthetic NJ 
State Weight State Weight 
Alabama 0 Mississippi 0 
Arizona 0 Missouri 0 
Arkansas 0 North Carolina 0 
Colorado 0.124 North Dakota 0 
Georgia 0 South Carolina 0 
Idaho 0 Tennessee 0 
Indiana 0.446 Texas 0.174 
Kansas 0 Utah 0 
Kentucky 0 Virginia 0 
Louisiana 0 West Virginia 0 
Maryland 0.255 Wyoming 0 
 
 
 As can be seen from Table 13 with the matched variables for New Jersey, the 
synthetically created control made from the weights above matches the observed mean 
characteristics for the following predictive variables sufficiently well in the pre-treatment 
period. We can be confident that the process has created a relevant control capable of 
accurately identifying a treatment effect. 
 
 
Table 14 New Jersey Synthetic Control Results 
Matched Variable For New Jersey Treated Synthetic  
Ln(State pop) 15.68333 15.28677 
Ln(Per capita personal income) 9.72366 9.545695 
Ln(State private GDP per capita) 9.862049 9.687075 
Total Spending Per capita in 1958 1647.216 1627.666 
Total Spending Per capita in 1968 2407.514 2437.938 




    
 
Figure 1 NJ Synthetic Control Graph 
 A further placebo test helps validate the treatment effect that was found for New 
Jersey. In order to determine the statistical significance of the results it is necessary to test 
whether the same treatment effect can be found when comparing control states with the 
other states within the control group. If there are any states that create a treatment effect as 
large, or larger, than what is found by studying New Jersey, then the reliability of the results 
becomes questionable. Figure 2 presents a graphical representation of a placebo test. 
 
Figure 2 Placebo Test for Synthetic NJ 
 
 The dashed line in Figure 2 represents the difference between the synthetic New 
Jersey and the actual New Jersey. The red dotted line represents the year of treatment. We 
can see that the largest treatment effect is found with the treated New Jersey and not one of 






















































    
and therefore we can be confident that it is statistically significant at the 5% level. Also it is 
important to note that over time the distance between the synthetic New Jersey and the 
actual New Jersey is widening implying that the treatment effect is growing over time. 
 
 The synthetic control for New York does not perform as well as New Jersey. 
However, we can see that for the most part the treatment effect found by the synthetic 
control method is higher than the majority of the placebo tests except between 1980-1990. 
The weights and matched performance for New York, as well as the following states, can be 
found in Appendix A. 
 
 
Figure 3 NY Synthetic Control Graph 
 























































    
 Like New York, Ohio also does not perform as well as New Jersey. However we 
can see that after the treatment period (the dotted line) the difference between the synthetic 
and actual Ohio begins to grow larger. By the end of the time sample there is only one 
observation that records a treatment effect higher than the difference between the synthetic 
Ohio and the actual Ohio meaning that these results are significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
Figure 5 OH Synthetic Control Graph 
 
Figure 6 Placebo Test for Synthetic OH 
 
  
 As stated earlier, at first glance South Dakota appears to provide a counter 
example to our broader finding that higher government expenditures result from more 


















































    
control group made up of states with minimal exposure to compulsory collective bargaining 
laws experiences higher expenditure levels than the actual South Dakota. However, further 
placebo tests shown in Figure 8 show that this is not a statistically valid result and therefore 
this case-study does not diminish the overall findings of the study. 
 
 
Figure 7 SD Synthetic Control Graph 
 In the figure below, South Dakota is represented by the bold, dashed red line. 
There are at least 5 placebo synthetic controls that record higher levels of a treatment effect 
which causes this model’s results to be statistically insignificant at the 10% level. 
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Conclusion 
 
 This paper presents the most comprehensive study of competing collective 
bargaining institutional arrangements’ effects on government expenditures to date. After 
examining all 50 states from 1957-2011 it is found that when state governments choose to 
grant greater collective bargaining powers to public sector unions, government expenditures 
increase throughout all levels of local and state government. This increase in total state-wide 
government expenditures can be anywhere from $104.1-125.1 to $546.0-653.5 per capita 
depending on the collective bargaining laws that are chosen for state employees. Similar 
effects are seen across four additional government sectors (police, firefighters, teachers, and 
other local employees—see Appendix A). These results are robust to different qualitative 
ranking scales, as well as a data-driven synthetic control case study approach.   
 
 However, it is unclear where the increased expenditures is being spent. FTE 
employment and payrolls do not seem to be proportionally affected by the collective 
bargaining institutions. Overall these results are similar to those found by previous studies 
with the exception of unions’ effects on departmental spending which was previously found 
to be statistically insignificant.40 
 
 These findings present a strong case for a policy recommendation that decreased 
compulsory rights to public sector employees can lead to decreased tax burdens for 
taxpayers. Most states have a balanced budget provision which intimately ties the level of 
expenditures to the level of taxes. Because of this the increased expenditures caused by the 
compulsory rights given to the generally politically active public sector unions must lead to 
increased taxes no matter if the public sector employees are self-interested or enthusiastic 
do-gooders. This increase in expenditures/taxes may be seen as beneficial if the quality of 
the government services were increased as a result, however this is unlikely because previous 
research has shed doubt on the idea that increased government spending generates better 
performing governmental departments.41 Further research may be needed in order to further 
validate this concern. 
 
 This paper has also found that traditional theories that ignore insights from public 
choice economics do not correctly explain how collective bargaining laws effect state 
governments. Theories which expect a re-distributional effect where a unionized sector takes 
government funds from a competing, but non-unionized sector do not correctly explain the 
observed overall increase in government spending. Traditional theories also do not correctly 
anticipate where the increased expenditures are being spent. The increase in expenditures 
does not seem to proportionally increase the number of public employees nor does it 
increase public employee wages. Instead, it is suggested that the increased expenditures are 
going to direct or deferred benefits for the public employees. This would include increased 
healthcare, insurance, better equipment/facilities, or possibly other unfunded liabilities such 
as increased pensions. 
                                                          
40 See Marlow op cit note 28 and Marlow and Orzechowski op cit note 27 
41 See Moe, Terry M. "Collective bargaining and the performance of the public schools." American Journal of 
Political Science 53, no. 1 (2009): 156-174. 
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 The overall conclusions drawn by this paper would benefit from further research 
that analyzes individual state's pension liabilities. This could shed light on whether the 
increases in expenditures are primarily contributing to increases in deferred unfunded 
liabilities which are a leading factor in state solvency issues. Previous research has concluded 
that over 70% of state and local government budgets is comprised of wages and benefits for 
public employees42. If this is still the case, and if wages are not being significantly increased 
as this study concludes, a policy recommendation may be made that less favorable attitudes 
and less collective bargaining powers towards public sector unions may help state's remain 
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Appendix A—Additional Results 
Fire 
 
    FE   FE 
VARIABLES Tot. Gov Fire FTE Tot. Gov Fire FTE Tot. Gov. Fire Payrolls Tot. Gov. Fire Payrolls 
CB Fire -2.88e-06 -7.08e-06 0.0538*** 0.0380** 
 (3.55e-06) (6.38e-06) (0.0122) (0.0174) 
Fire Strike -3.13e-05** -2.50e-05* -0.00649 -0.0169 
 (1.53e-05) (1.38e-05) (0.0465) (0.0644) 
Right to Work -4.68e-05*** -3.00e-05 -0.147*** -0.485*** 
 (1.11e-05) (2.10e-05) (0.0405) (0.0703) 
Dem in Gov Office 1.50e-05 -3.63e-06 0.0483 -0.0401 
 (2.15e-05) (6.50e-06) (0.0918) (0.0353) 
Time -1.22e-05*** -2.40e-07 -0.103*** 0.0346 
 (2.58e-06) (3.90e-06) (0.0184) (0.0206) 
Time2 1.52e-08 -4.28e-08 0.000850*** 0.000156 
 (3.28e-08) (4.74e-08) (0.000161) (0.000175) 
Ln(Per Cap Income) 0.000748*** 0.000379*** 5.117*** 0.967* 
 (5.35e-05) (6.14e-05) (0.542) (0.484) 
Lag ln(State Pop) 0*** 0 5.64e-08*** 1.14e-07*** 
 (0) (0) (4.24e-09) (1.25e-08) 
All Gov Welfare FTE -4.45e-09*** -2.13e-09*** -2.99e-05*** -4.31e-05*** 
 (4.74e-10) (6.43e-10) (3.85e-06) (3.72e-06) 
Constant -0.00618*** -0.00274*** -46.14*** -7.515 
 (0.000505) (0.000570) (5.020) (4.493) 
Observations 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 
R-squared 0.219 0.311 0.561 0.742 
Number of groups 50 50 50 50 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
    
























CB Fire 195.1*** 98.21*** 139.3*** 73.00*** 98.01*** 56.15*** 1.239*** 0.749 
 (12.25) (18.37) (10.20) (16.40) (6.567) (9.096) (0.318) (0.494) 
Fire Strike 652.9*** 131.7 542.9*** 120.9 344.2*** 138.9** 3.737*** 1.537 
 (167.3) (140.5) (146.3) (126.1) (58.49) (55.74) (1.288) (2.418) 
Right to Work -24.34 -451.3*** -380.4*** -425.4*** 384.6*** -143.7* -3.560*** -3.623 
 (61.63) (147.1) (81.71) (109.6) (41.74) (85.00) (1.143) (2.869) 
Dem in Gov Office 71.92 40.12 60.08 27.20 36.79 44.36* 0.691 0.153 
 (69.34) (42.80) (59.62) (32.77) (39.81) (22.67) (1.525) (0.845) 
Time -78.65*** 57.01** -30.65* 49.78** -40.98*** 14.43 -2.085*** 0.764* 
 (19.35) (25.77) (15.27) (22.33) (11.40) (14.47) (0.283) (0.427) 
Time2 2.155*** 1.493*** 1.419*** 1.064*** 0.822*** 0.522*** 0.0348*** 0.0207*** 
 (0.178) (0.186) (0.140) (0.165) (0.0992) (0.103) (0.00321) (0.00342) 
Ln(Per Cap Income) 4,093*** 62.08 2,185*** -298.6 2,300*** 766.7* 79.90*** -8.107 
 (568.1) (671.9) (452.5) (562.0) (283.4) (388.5) (9.574) (11.20) 
Lag ln(State Pop) -5.88e-06 -1.18e-05 -4.56e-05*** -8.12e-05*** 6.22e-05*** 7.74e-05*** 7.3e-07*** 2.4e-06*** 
 (4.69e-06) (9.88e-06) (3.07e-06) (8.46e-06) (4.83e-06) (6.84e-06) (8.43e-08) (2.55e-07) 
All Gov Welfare 
FTE 0.00400*** 0.00379 -0.00210* 0.00365 0.00869*** 0.00247 -0.0005*** -0.0007*** 
 (0.000692) (0.00401) (0.00111) (0.00467) (0.000309) (0.00230) (8.08e-05) (0.000106) 
Constant -37,832*** 922.9 -20,295*** 3,816 -21,577*** -6,759* -727.3*** 91.06 
 (5,475) (6,262) (4,387) (5,218) (2,698) (3,621) (90.32) (106.6) 
Observations 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 
R-squared 0.797 0.918 0.719 0.881 0.781 0.895 0.647 0.771 
Number of groups 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    























Fire Comp. 805.7*** 456.4*** 576.0*** 357.5*** 402.1*** 243.4*** 6.789*** 6.125*** 
 (60.59) (105.9) (50.41) (96.67) (26.77) (46.33) (1.248) (2.036) 
Fire Strike 585.4*** 127.4 494.9*** 120.6 309.6*** 133.7** 3.700*** 1.930 
 (172.5) (140.7) (150.9) (127.0) (60.03) (56.10) (1.201) (2.298) 
Right to Work -90.91 -451.0*** -427.8*** -426.4*** 350.6*** -142.2 -3.612*** -3.806 
 (74.25) (149.5) (92.75) (111.6) (35.06) (86.79) (1.018) (2.813) 
Dem in Gov Office 60.38 39.50 51.84 25.89 30.99 44.82* 0.621 0.0250 
 (67.62) (43.89) (59.22) (33.82) (38.12) (23.24) (1.517) (0.821) 
Time -71.88*** 64.37** -25.83* 54.23** -37.53*** 19.62 -2.073*** 0.673* 
 (18.82) (25.33) (14.97) (21.98) (11.02) (14.30) (0.282) (0.367) 
Time2 2.065*** 1.446*** 1.354*** 1.038*** 0.776*** 0.485*** 0.0348*** 0.0217*** 
 (0.172) (0.180) (0.136) (0.162) (0.0943) (0.101) (0.00336) (0.00323) 
Ln(Per Cap Income) 4,220*** -53.92 2,275*** -373.2 2,365*** 689.1* 79.75*** -7.300 
 (566.3) (664.4) (445.7) (554.5) (288.0) (386.1) (9.477) (10.10) 
Lag ln(State Pop) -1.44e-05*** -2.06e-05* -5.16e-05*** -8.79e-05*** 5.79e-05*** 7.26e-05*** 7.0e-07*** 2.3e-06*** 
 (4.53e-06) (1.12e-05) (3.15e-06) (9.42e-06) (4.70e-06) (7.20e-06) (8.91e-08) (2.57e-07) 
All Gov Welfare 
FTE 0.00167*** 0.00410 -0.00376*** 0.00381 0.00752*** 0.00272 -0.0005*** -0.0007*** 
 (0.000616) (0.00413) (0.00120) (0.00496) (0.000345) (0.00213) (7.69e-05) (0.000103) 
Constant -38,472*** 2,225 -20,748*** 4,674 -21,912*** -5,909 -723.1*** 85.12 
 (5,453) (6,196) (4,332) (5,152) (2,732) (3,602) (89.67) (95.49) 
Observations 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 
R-squared 0.792 0.918 0.714 0.881 0.775 0.895 0.648 0.772 
Number of groups 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 





  DK1 DKFE1 DK1 DKFE1 
VARIABLES 
Tot. Gov Fire 
FTE 
Tot. Gov Fire 
FTE 
Tot. Gov. Fire 
Payrolls 
Tot. Gov. Fire 
Payrolls 
Fire Comp. -3.46e-06 1.28e-05 0.278*** 0.338*** 
 (1.88e-05) (4.00e-05) (0.0608) (0.0931) 
Fire Strike -2.83e-05* -1.74e-05 -0.0119 0.00740 
 (1.52e-05) (1.28e-05) (0.0433) (0.0605) 
Right to Work -4.39e-05*** -3.33e-05 -0.153*** -0.496*** 
 (1.18e-05) (2.07e-05) (0.0409) (0.0722) 
Dem in Gov Office 1.52e-05 -5.71e-06 0.0452 -0.0479 
 (2.14e-05) (6.42e-06) (0.0916) (0.0342) 
Time -1.24e-05*** -3.33e-06 -0.102*** 0.0284 
 (2.66e-06) (3.80e-06) (0.0184) (0.0192) 
Time2 1.96e-08 -1.49e-08 0.000846*** 0.000224 
 (3.44e-08) (4.77e-08) (0.000162) (0.000167) 
Ln(Per Cap 
Income) 0.000742*** 0.000417*** 5.119*** 1.025** 
 (5.27e-05) (6.02e-05) (0.535) (0.447) 
Lag ln(State Pop) 0*** 0 5.46e-08*** 1.09e-07*** 
 (0) (0) (4.18e-09) (1.27e-08) 
All Gov Welfare 
FTE -4.41e-09*** -2.33e-09*** -3.05e-05*** -4.36e-05*** 
 (4.45e-10) (6.57e-10) (3.76e-06) (3.62e-06) 
Constant -0.00613*** -0.00311*** -46.04*** -7.980* 
 (0.000500) (0.000559) (4.988) (4.136) 
Observations 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 
R-squared 0.219 0.309 0.562 0.745 
Number of groups 50 50 50 50 







  DK1 DKFE1 DK1 DKFE1 
VARIABLES 
Tot. Gov Police 
FTE 
Tot. Gov Police 
FTE 
Tot. Gov Police 
Payrolls 
Tot. Gov Police 
Payrolls 
CB Police -3.57e-06 -2.75e-06 0.225*** 0.211*** 
 (3.20e-06) (6.32e-06) (0.0335) (0.0268) 
Police Strike 7.21e-05*** -9.81e-06 0.452*** 0.137 
 (1.05e-05) (1.49e-05) (0.120) (0.176) 
Right to Work 0.000121*** 7.88e-05* 0.323*** -0.160 
 (1.99e-05) (3.93e-05) (0.0691) (0.161) 
Dem in Gov 
Office 4.41e-05 2.43e-06 0.215** 0.0102 
 (3.14e-05) (1.31e-05) (0.0952) (0.0804) 
Time 1.61e-05*** 3.17e-05*** -0.169*** 0.0736 
 (5.70e-06) (6.62e-06) (0.0489) (0.0449) 
Time2 -4.00e-07*** -4.30e-07*** 0.00146*** 0.000365 
 (8.00e-08) (7.52e-08) (0.000314) (0.000257) 
Ln(Per Cap 
Income) 0.00161*** 0.000965*** 11.74*** 4.046*** 
 (8.40e-05) (0.000147) (1.527) (1.454) 
Lag ln(State Pop) 0*** -0*** 1.74e-07*** 1.93e-07*** 
 (0) (0) (1.14e-08) (1.64e-08) 
All Gov Welfare 
FTE -7.53e-09*** 1.75e-09 -4.06e-05*** -5.65e-05*** 
 (2.94e-10) (1.58e-09) (2.82e-06) (6.91e-06) 
Constant -0.0140*** -0.00775*** -108.7*** -36.24** 
 (0.000771) (0.00136) (14.21) (13.67) 
Observations 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 
R-squared 0.665 0.831 0.800 0.855 
Number of 
groups 50 50 50 50 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 























CB Police 184.1*** 98.21*** 132.9*** 86.78*** 82.36*** 43.41*** 4.014*** 3.252*** 
 (10.91) (16.82) (9.272) (17.00) (5.104) (7.176) (0.497) (0.479) 
Police Strike 629.4*** 118.7 470.5*** 85.50 369.7*** 158.1** 14.32*** 3.237 
 (180.0) (148.0) (150.0) (126.1) (68.00) (66.35) (3.185) (3.590) 
Right to Work 149.2* -189.9 -248.1*** -188.1 455.4*** 37.17 11.54*** 13.05*** 
 (79.91) (165.7) (85.59) (135.2) (52.95) (90.47) (1.772) (3.863) 
Dem in Gov Office 75.02 43.35 63.50 26.89 36.15 50.49** 3.370* 1.010 
 (70.78) (41.08) (58.78) (31.57) (41.09) (22.24) (1.705) (1.285) 
Time -78.25*** 56.73** -31.92** 43.21** -39.22*** 19.66 -2.916*** 1.706* 
 (19.60) (24.99) (15.63) (21.50) (11.66) (14.76) (0.662) (0.875) 
Time2 2.137*** 1.489*** 1.430*** 1.116*** 0.784*** 0.474*** 0.0597*** 0.0393*** 
 (0.171) (0.178) (0.137) (0.159) (0.0970) (0.103) (0.00520) (0.00573) 
Ln(Per Cap Income) 4,216*** 86.02 2,256*** -202.3 2,413*** 704.8* 161.5*** 5.381 
 (587.6) (662.1) (461.5) (548.9) (303.3) (394.2) (20.89) (24.07) 
Lag ln(State Pop) -1.29e-05*** -9.70e-06 -5.13e-05*** -7.82e-05*** 5.85e-05*** 7.99e-05*** 2.41e-06*** 4.67e-06*** 
 (4.71e-06) (9.83e-06) (3.12e-06) (8.42e-06) (4.87e-06) (7.07e-06) (2.07e-07) (3.11e-07) 
All Gov Welfare 
FTE 0.00440*** 0.00433 -0.00166 0.00404 0.00886*** 0.00306 -0.000572*** -0.000435*** 
 (0.000817) (0.00378) (0.000997) (0.00425) (0.000324) (0.00231) (4.79e-05) (0.000114) 
Constant -38,970*** 624.7 -20,849*** 2,879 -22,682*** -6,283* -1,509*** -41.60 
 (5,688) (6,194) (4,486) (5,104) (2,909) (3,686) (198.0) (226.0) 
Observations 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 
R-squared 0.791 0.918 0.711 0.882 0.774 0.895 0.828 0.915 
Number of groups 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 























Police Comp. 812.3*** 533.3*** 592.0*** 470.9*** 349.6*** 226.9*** 18.83*** 18.61*** 
 (71.89) (105.4) (62.66) (100.7) (30.08) (44.82) (2.216) (2.368) 
Police Strike 559.2*** 114.6 421.6*** 81.82 334.0*** 154.7** 13.14*** 3.269 
 (183.0) (148.3) (154.7) (127.5) (67.16) (66.32) (3.137) (3.622) 
Right to Work 67.42 -173.7 -305.0*** -173.8 413.7*** 41.00 10.17*** 13.95*** 
 (90.20) (172.2) (99.19) (139.8) (44.48) (92.92) (1.374) (3.926) 
Dem in Gov Office 63.62 43.54 55.30 27.07 30.99 50.86** 3.127* 0.985 
 (68.94) (40.48) (57.96) (31.10) (40.40) (22.17) (1.817) (1.275) 
Time -73.78*** 59.88** -28.78* 46.01** -37.00*** 21.52 -2.836*** 1.761** 
 (18.71) (24.48) (15.06) (21.29) (11.22) (14.30) (0.630) (0.842) 
Time2 2.090*** 1.488*** 1.397*** 1.115*** 0.758*** 0.470*** 0.0590*** 0.0398*** 
 (0.164) (0.173) (0.130) (0.156) (0.0929) (0.0994) (0.00486) (0.00545) 
Ln(Per Cap Income) 4,285*** -10.73 2,303*** -288.0 2,452*** 656.7* 162.4*** 2.745 
 (585.8) (651.5) (456.1) (543.1) (306.4) (386.7) (21.01) (23.38) 
Lag ln(State Pop) -2.05e-05*** -1.58e-05 -5.68e-05*** -8.36e-05*** 5.50e-05*** 7.72e-05*** 2.25e-06*** 4.47e-06*** 
 (4.83e-06) (1.03e-05) (3.14e-06) (8.71e-06) (4.92e-06) (7.13e-06) (1.94e-07) (3.04e-07) 
All Gov Welfare 
FTE 0.00221*** 0.00429 -0.00325*** 0.00400 0.00788*** 0.00307 -0.000620*** -0.000440*** 
 (0.000629) (0.00373) (0.00106) (0.00443) (0.000317) (0.00216) (4.82e-05) (0.000119) 
Constant -39,077*** 1,748 -20,903*** 3,873 -22,788*** -5,735 -1,506*** -9.941 
 (5,656) (6,088) (4,437) (5,046) (2,923) (3,612) (198.8) (218.9) 
Observations 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 
R-squared 0.788 0.919 0.708 0.883 0.770 0.895 0.827 0.916 
Number of groups 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 








    FE   FE 
VARIABLES 
Tot. Gov Police 
FTE 
Tot. Gov Police 
FTE 
Tot. Gov Police 
Payrolls 
Tot. Gov Police 
Payrolls 
Police Comp. -2.11e-05 2.74e-05 1.000*** 1.125*** 
 (3.30e-05) (4.31e-05) (0.188) (0.162) 
Police Strike 7.18e-05*** -2.19e-06 0.368*** 0.125 
 (8.00e-06) (1.39e-05) (0.120) (0.174) 
Right to Work 0.000121*** 9.44e-05** 0.225*** -0.133 
 (1.54e-05) (4.11e-05) (0.0546) (0.155) 
Dem in Gov 
Office 4.43e-05 1.02e-06 0.201* 0.0113 
 (3.13e-05) (1.27e-05) (0.101) (0.0820) 
Time 1.61e-05*** 2.94e-05*** -0.164*** 0.0815* 
 (5.64e-06) (6.79e-06) (0.0470) (0.0443) 
Time2 -4.00e-07*** -4.09e-07*** 0.00141*** 0.000353 
 (7.83e-08) (7.56e-08) (0.000284) (0.000250) 
Ln(Per Cap 
Income) 0.00161*** 0.000993*** 11.82*** 3.826** 
 (8.82e-05) (0.000148) (1.551) (1.438) 
Lag ln(State Pop) 0*** -0** 1.64e-07*** 1.80e-07*** 
 (0) (0) (1.06e-08) (1.61e-08) 
All Gov Welfare 
FTE -7.49e-09*** 1.60e-09 -4.33e-05*** -5.65e-05*** 
 (3.11e-10) (1.57e-09) (2.82e-06) (6.10e-06) 
Constant -0.0141*** -0.00803*** -108.8*** -33.71** 
 (0.000808) (0.00137) (14.42) (13.52) 
Observations 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 
R-squared 0.665 0.831 0.798 0.855 
Number of 
groups 50 50 50 50 






    FE   FE 
VARIABLES Tot. K-12 FTE Tot. K-12 FTE Tot. K-12 Payrolls Tot. K-12 Payrolls 
CB Teachers -0.000284*** -4.63e-05 -0.399* 0.308 
 (4.50e-05) (6.54e-05) (0.226) (0.263) 
Teachers Strike 0.000481*** -0.000194 2.797*** 0.521 
 (7.83e-05) (0.000132) (0.532) (0.553) 
Right to Work 0.000964*** 0.000134 -1.637 -5.973*** 
 (0.000149) (0.000560) (1.217) (1.957) 
Dem in Gov Office -0.000466** -0.000155 -1.140 -0.449 
 (0.000221) (0.000131) (0.745) (0.649) 
Time 0.000617*** 0.000313*** 0.410 0.489 
 (6.94e-05) (9.94e-05) (0.384) (0.485) 
Time2 -5.70e-06*** -3.71e-06*** -0.00329 -0.00196 
 (9.77e-07) (1.03e-06) (0.00425) (0.00460) 
Ln(Per Cap Income) 0.00150 0.00863*** 56.08*** 48.26*** 
 (0.00134) (0.00198) (6.877) (9.604) 
Lag ln(State Pop) -2.97e-10*** -3.79e-10*** -5.27e-07*** -1.01e-06*** 
 (0) (0) (6.88e-08) (1.77e-07) 
All Gov Welfare FTE 2.52e-08** 9.20e-08*** 1.08e-06 3.52e-05 
 (1.04e-08) (2.25e-08) (2.06e-05) (5.90e-05) 
Constant 5.62e-05 -0.0650*** -490.8*** -412.1*** 
 (0.0125) (0.0182) (61.64) (86.74) 
Observations 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 
R-squared 0.690 0.847 0.773 0.880 
Number of groups 50 50 50 50 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 



















CB Teachers 44.70** 39.20*** 25.55* 35.23** 15.68* 10.75 -5.148 4.821 
 (18.35) (13.44) (15.13) (14.50) (9.015) (8.693) (4.615) (3.643) 
Teachers Strike 512.7*** 167.6*** 468.8*** 145.5*** 120.0*** 73.20*** 77.43*** 43.12*** 
 (42.88) (36.38) (34.92) (42.43) (24.28) (19.58) (9.528) (6.649) 
Right to Work 59.71 -334.6** -276.4*** -313.9*** 353.2*** -41.26 -13.42 -80.53** 
 (65.99) (143.0) (83.90) (110.4) (38.32) (87.64) (16.68) (33.76) 
Dem in Gov 
Office 48.57 51.87 39.11 34.73 31.08 53.29** -12.62 2.273 
 (65.81) (43.29) (55.97) (33.33) (41.49) (23.58) (8.057) (8.569) 
Time -67.08*** 73.68*** -22.95 58.90*** -35.58*** 24.43 -13.25** -3.531 
 (20.43) (25.90) (17.16) (21.85) (11.06) (17.22) (4.994) (6.711) 
Time2 1.890*** 1.310*** 1.222*** 0.953*** 0.709*** 0.418*** 0.298*** 0.275*** 
 (0.169) (0.179) (0.141) (0.163) (0.0886) (0.115) (0.0415) (0.0536) 
Ln(Per Cap 
Income) 4,604*** -44.11 2,596*** -327.7 2,523*** 680.2 982.1*** 600.3*** 
 (685.2) (696.5) (527.0) (558.6) (334.7) (451.8) (136.4) (166.5) 
Lag ln(State Pop) -1.55e-05** -6.42e-06 -5.25e-05*** -7.53e-05*** 5.45e-05*** 8.03e-05*** -4.76e-06*** -4.64e-06 
 (7.21e-06) (9.24e-06) (4.79e-06) (8.19e-06) (5.97e-06) (7.62e-06) (1.45e-06) (3.09e-06) 
Total Welfare FTE -0.00244*** 0.00283 -0.00729*** 0.00266 0.00654*** 0.00303 -0.000385 -0.000795 
 (0.000509) (0.00397) (0.000864) (0.00502) (0.000416) (0.00223) (0.000256) (0.000929) 
Constant -42,122*** 1,850 -23,835*** 4,025 -23,100*** -5,831 -8,776*** -5,161*** 
 (6,396) (6,460) (4,891) (5,140) (3,138) (4,213) (1,253) (1,537) 
Observations 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 
R-squared 0.790 0.918 0.718 0.881 0.758 0.893 0.799 0.885 
Number of groups 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 























K-12 Comp. 197.3** 220.7*** 134.6* 223.9*** 69.79 49.62 -2.606 35.50 
 (93.62) (80.87) (70.57) (73.96) (50.24) (35.06) (21.98) (22.13) 
Teachers Strike 516.8*** 168.6*** 471.5*** 146.2*** 121.5*** 73.58*** 77.24*** 43.17*** 
 (41.55) (36.35) (33.70) (43.31) (23.64) (19.54) (9.060) (6.479) 
Right to Work 49.53 -335.0** -276.3*** -308.3*** 349.8*** -43.86 -6.832 -78.64** 
 (66.57) (143.8) (82.83) (109.7) (37.09) (88.25) (14.84) (33.76) 
Dem in Gov Office 45.44 48.12 37.67 30.39 30.00 52.69** -11.94 1.491 
 (66.86) (44.22) (56.74) (34.09) (41.71) (23.79) (8.213) (9.015) 
Time -66.37*** 71.39*** -22.93 55.15** -35.34*** 24.53 -13.69*** -4.370 
 (20.51) (25.46) (17.25) (21.83) (11.00) (16.21) (4.957) (6.394) 
Time2 1.883*** 1.335*** 1.227*** 0.991*** 0.707*** 0.418*** 0.307*** 0.283*** 
 (0.169) (0.180) (0.141) (0.168) (0.0878) (0.108) (0.0415) (0.0516) 
Ln(Per Cap Income) 4,613*** -10.26 2,582*** -278.8 2,526*** 681.6 963.9*** 610.5*** 
 (689.9) (683.2) (523.5) (548.7) (341.4) (440.3) (134.6) (161.3) 
Lag ln(State Pop) -1.7e-05*** -1.07e-05 -5.37e-05*** -7.92e-05*** 5.36e-05*** 7.91e-05*** -4.3e-06*** -5.18e-06 
 (6.67e-06) (9.78e-06) (4.18e-06) (8.42e-06) (5.75e-06) (7.28e-06) (1.37e-06) (3.15e-06) 
All Gov Welfare 
FTE -0.00286*** 0.00227 -0.00761*** 0.00198 0.00639*** 0.00295 -0.000417 -0.000919 
 (0.000575) (0.00411) (0.000911) (0.00510) (0.000424) (0.00223) (0.000261) (0.000972) 
Constant -42,100*** 1,643 -23,647*** 3,671 -23,088*** -5,817 -8,617*** -5,241*** 
 (6,478) (6,345) (4,888) (5,057) (3,217) (4,099) (1,246) (1,492) 
Observations 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 
R-squared 0.790 0.918 0.718 0.881 0.758 0.893 0.798 0.886 
Number of groups 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 




    FE   FE 
VARIABLES Local K12 Payrolls Local K12 Payrolls Tot. K-12 FTE Tot. K-12 FTE 
K-12 Comp. -0.245 1.463 -0.00121*** -0.000136 
 (0.817) (1.100) (0.000184) (0.000303) 
Teachers Strike -0.737 0.633 0.000456*** -0.000196 
 (0.470) (0.407) (7.77e-05) (0.000131) 
Right to Work -0.525 -3.951** 0.00104*** 0.000163 
 (0.815) (1.888) (0.000137) (0.000551) 
Dem in Gov Office -1.512 -0.288 -0.000445* -0.000156 
 (1.158) (0.554) (0.000223) (0.000130) 
Time 0.0863 0.0602 0.000612*** 0.000307*** 
 (0.283) (0.368) (6.91e-05) (0.000101) 
Time2 0.000599 0.00125 -5.64e-06*** -3.66e-06*** 
 (0.00294) (0.00336) (9.69e-07) (1.05e-06) 
Ln(Per Cap Income) 37.45*** 38.18*** 0.00141 0.00868*** 
 (5.570) (7.694) (0.00135) (0.00200) 
Lag ln(State Pop) 3.40e-07*** -3.07e-07* -2.82e-10*** -3.74e-10*** 
 (4.40e-08) (1.67e-07) (0) (0) 
All Gov Welfare FTE 5.28e-05** 2.81e-05 2.77e-08** 9.19e-08*** 
 (2.21e-05) (5.46e-05) (1.06e-08) (2.23e-08) 
Constant -320.1*** -326.5*** 0.000233 -0.0656*** 
 (50.77) (70.20) (0.0126) (0.0183) 
Observations 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 
R-squared 0.609 0.828 0.689 0.847 
Number of groups 50 50 50 50 




Other Local Government Employees 
 






Tot. Gov. Other 
Payrolls 
Tot. Gov. Other 
Payrolls 
CB Other 3.51e-05*** 4.89e-05*** 0.137*** 0.200*** 
 (5.22e-06) (1.38e-05) (0.0224) (0.0473) 
Other Strike 0.000116*** -2.86e-05 0.576*** -0.0635 
 (1.07e-05) (2.72e-05) (0.0640) (0.0681) 
Right to Work 6.15e-05*** -1.80e-05 0.277*** -0.0326 
 (1.95e-05) (2.58e-05) (0.0741) (0.0910) 
Dem in Gov Office -8.75e-08 2.81e-05 0.0217 0.0485 
 (2.52e-05) (2.11e-05) (0.0641) (0.0601) 
Time -4.77e-05*** -6.16e-05*** -0.184*** -0.170*** 
 (1.75e-05) (1.89e-05) (0.0450) (0.0566) 
Time2 2.25e-07 3.32e-07 0.000875 0.00100 
 (2.93e-07) (2.83e-07) (0.000767) (0.000746) 
Ln(Per Cap 
Income) 0.00110*** 0.00134*** 6.300*** 5.132*** 
 (0.000170) (0.000191) (0.877) (1.035) 
Lag ln(State Pop) -0*** -0*** -5.51e-08*** -5.03e-08*** 
 (0) (0) (4.13e-09) (9.88e-09) 
All Gov Welfare 
FTE -1.69e-09** 4.80e-09** -1.00e-05*** 6.19e-06 
 (7.68e-10) (1.88e-09) (2.10e-06) (4.57e-06) 
Constant -0.00901*** -0.0111*** -56.74*** -44.77*** 
 (0.00164) (0.00177) (8.238) (9.509) 
Observations 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 
R-squared 0.296 0.188 0.383 0.161 
Number of groups 50 50 50 50 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 























CB Other 100.8*** 85.98*** 73.45*** 84.47*** 27.90*** 18.68*** 16.17*** -0.840 
 (15.32) (14.25) (14.97) (13.68) (6.573) (6.863) (4.182) (5.515) 
Other Strike 455.9*** 98.72** 411.9*** 75.96 124.8*** 56.91*** 53.98*** 30.08* 
 (44.50) (37.75) (35.84) (47.27) (25.42) (20.45) (15.36) (15.12) 
Right to Work 118.8* -247.0 -232.8*** -224.6* 374.6*** -23.17 368.9*** 27.62 
 (60.40) (153.8) (66.59) (122.3) (39.63) (88.04) (42.34) (63.09) 
Dem in Gov Office 64.07 48.96 50.39 31.75 33.96 52.60** 39.87 49.60** 
 (67.46) (41.68) (56.67) (31.57) (40.83) (23.71) (34.33) (19.63) 
Time -75.38*** 59.79** -30.40* 44.24** -37.46*** 22.10 -17.48*** 26.37*** 
 (20.45) (24.56) (16.95) (21.33) (11.15) (15.53) (5.812) (8.947) 
Time2 2.032*** 1.453*** 1.349*** 1.102*** 0.738*** 0.445*** 0.313*** 0.0762 
 (0.167) (0.168) (0.142) (0.159) (0.0855) (0.0996) (0.0596) (0.0597) 
Ln(Per Cap Income) 4,440*** 74.35 2,448*** -198.6 2,499*** 691.3 1,324*** 71.20 
 (639.0) (669.2) (499.2) (543.3) (325.7) (431.6) (180.7) (266.4) 
Lag ln(State Pop) -1.44e-05** -7.39e-06 -5.12e-05*** -7.60e-05*** 5.48e-05*** 7.98e-05*** 5.58e-05*** 7.74e-05*** 
 (6.53e-06) (9.38e-06) (4.13e-06) (8.13e-06) (5.48e-06) (7.28e-06) (4.16e-06) (4.80e-06) 
All Gov Welfare 
FTE -0.00218*** 0.00449 -0.00733*** 0.00431 0.00650*** 0.00333 0.00810*** 0.00491*** 
 (0.000749) (0.00368) (0.00106) (0.00461) (0.000515) (0.00224) (0.000303) (0.00181) 
Constant -40,581*** 783.0 -22,427*** 2,855 -22,906*** -5,919 -12,368*** -615.2 
 (5,979) (6,210) (4,637) (5,006) (3,059) (4,019) (1,725) (2,498) 
Observations 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 
R-squared 0.791 0.918 0.717 0.882 0.760 0.893 0.633 0.805 
Number of groups 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 























Other Comp. 575.6*** 520.2*** 383.2*** 455.1*** 239.6*** 181.7*** 161.7*** 67.12*** 
 (81.65) (93.33) (71.98) (79.39) (34.81) (38.82) (16.61) (20.93) 
Other Strike 455.6*** 88.03** 412.4*** 69.89 122.9*** 49.14** 52.37*** 24.47* 
 (44.35) (37.68) (35.75) (47.14) (24.92) (19.44) (14.78) (14.14) 
Right to Work 117.6* -200.6 -243.5*** -197.9 395.9*** 10.17 387.4*** 51.60 
 (61.81) (163.8) (69.80) (127.2) (43.24) (96.65) (45.91) (68.83) 
Dem in Gov Office 57.78 44.84 44.32 28.93 35.49 50.18** 41.69 48.05** 
 (69.32) (41.99) (58.38) (32.14) (41.31) (23.27) (34.68) (19.26) 
Time -72.15*** 55.64** -27.72 43.45** -37.28*** 17.15 -17.59*** 22.16*** 
 (19.85) (23.83) (16.94) (21.19) (10.73) (14.39) (5.473) (8.037) 
Time2 2.030*** 1.494*** 1.336*** 1.112*** 0.763*** 0.491*** 0.335*** 0.115** 
 (0.164) (0.165) (0.142) (0.160) (0.0846) (0.0932) (0.0585) (0.0547) 
Ln(Per Cap Income) 4,294*** 120.9 2,374*** -190.4 2,388*** 747.6* 1,240*** 119.2 
 (615.3) (652.7) (489.9) (537.8) (308.8) (409.7) (166.3) (250.1) 
Lag ln(State Pop) -1.97e-05*** -1.30e-05 -5.50e-05*** -8.13e-05*** 5.33e-05*** 7.84e-05*** 5.50e-05*** 7.73e-05*** 
 (6.07e-06) (1.03e-05) (3.58e-06) (8.27e-06) (5.52e-06) (7.59e-06) (4.26e-06) (4.97e-06) 
All Gov Welfare 
FTE -0.00232*** 0.00518 -0.00751*** 0.00485 0.00662*** 0.00366 0.00821*** 0.00509*** 
 (0.000770) (0.00359) (0.00108) (0.00450) (0.000537) (0.00226) (0.000305) (0.00181) 
Constant -38,988*** 563.0 -21,565*** 2,978 -21,807*** -6,383 -11,543*** -1,050 
 (5,787) (6,068) (4,582) (4,962) (2,915) (3,819) (1,598) (2,345) 
Observations 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 
R-squared 0.793 0.919 0.718 0.883 0.763 0.894 0.637 0.806 
Number of groups 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 










Tot. Gov. Other 
Payrolls 
Tot. Gov. Other 
Payrolls 
Other Comp. 0.000170*** 0.000222*** 0.737*** 0.976*** 
 (2.69e-05) (6.12e-05) (0.118) (0.215) 
Other Strike 0.000116*** -2.88e-05 0.577*** -0.0699 
 (1.03e-05) (2.70e-05) (0.0635) (0.0684) 
Right to Work 5.28e-05** -1.67e-05 0.263*** -0.00392 
 (1.98e-05) (2.42e-05) (0.0744) (0.0833) 
Dem in Gov Office -3.53e-06 2.74e-05 0.0114 0.0440 
 (2.55e-05) (2.09e-05) (0.0671) (0.0589) 
Time -4.63e-05** -5.96e-05*** -0.179*** -0.166*** 
 (1.75e-05) (1.91e-05) (0.0446) (0.0548) 
Time2 2.15e-07 3.15e-07 0.000858 0.000969 
 (2.94e-07) (2.87e-07) (0.000766) (0.000746) 
Ln(Per Cap 
Income) 0.00108*** 0.00132*** 6.142*** 5.084*** 
 (0.000170) (0.000187) (0.863) (0.992) 
Lag ln(State Pop) -0*** -0*** -6.22e-08*** -6.28e-08*** 
 (0) (0) (4.01e-09) (8.33e-09) 
All Gov Welfare 
FTE -1.80e-09** 5.01e-09*** -1.03e-05*** 7.20e-06 
 (7.60e-10) (1.86e-09) (2.11e-06) (4.47e-06) 
Constant -0.00871*** -0.0107*** -54.95*** -43.87*** 
 (0.00164) (0.00171) (8.129) (9.062) 
Observations 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 
R-squared 0.296 0.187 0.387 0.164 
Number of groups 50 50 50 50 




Average of All CB 
 














Avg of CB Laws 130.2*** 85.24*** 87.22*** 78.77*** 48.00*** 18.61* 
 (20.88) (26.29) (19.19) (22.95) (6.478) (10.50) 
1 if All Strikes >2 3,621*** 1,452* 3,249*** 1,160* 1,161*** 908.0*** 
 (976.5) (756.0) (850.4) (669.9) (361.9) (302.1) 
Right to Work 23.79 -248.7 -340.3*** -236.1* 370.9*** -15.87 
 (49.27) (161.2) (69.34) (127.3) (38.84) (94.40) 
Dem in Gov Office 109.3 46.17 90.82* 29.33 49.32 52.54** 
 (68.11) (39.66) (52.62) (30.87) (42.83) (21.02) 
Time -80.58*** 62.01** -33.39** 47.37** -40.22*** 24.01* 
 (16.48) (23.47) (13.16) (19.79) (10.24) (14.29) 
Time2 2.333*** 1.530*** 1.591*** 1.150*** 0.852*** 0.488*** 
 (0.151) (0.169) (0.134) (0.151) (0.0844) (0.0994) 
Ln(Per Cap Income) 3,750*** -259.9 1,871*** -481.8 2,251*** 483.6 
 (435.2) (610.4) (303.1) (496.0) (261.1) (377.0) 
Lag ln(State Pop) -1.63e-05** -1.07e-05 -5.e-05*** -7e-05*** 5e-05*** 7e-05*** 
 (6.30e-06) (8.13e-06) (4.02e-06) (7.85e-06) (5.44e-06) (6.23e-06) 
All Welfare FTE 0.0026*** 0.0063** -0.0030** 0.0056 0.0079*** 0.0046** 
 (0.000754) (0.00301) (0.00130) (0.00373) (0.00034) (0.00194) 
Constant -33,291*** 4,128 -16,244*** 5,685 -20,384*** -3,857 
 (4,021) (5,646) (2,741) (4,567) (2,441) (3,480) 
Observations 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 
R-squared 0.808 0.922 0.739 0.887 0.770 0.899 
Number of groups 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 




  FE  FE 
VARIABLES Tot. Gov Payrolls Tot. Gov Payrolls Tot. Gov FTE Tot. Gov FTE 
Avg of CB Laws 1.100** 1.364** -0.000227*** -8.28e-06 
 (0.485) (0.633) (5.99e-05) (0.000116) 
1 if All Strikes >2 75.90*** 39.21*** 0.0105*** 0.00448** 
 (17.48) (11.03) (0.00217) (0.00182) 
Right to Work 2.352*** -4.336 0.00274*** 0.00125 
 (0.829) (2.878) (0.000209) (0.000769) 
Dem in Gov Office 1.498 0.185 0.000181 -5.55e-05 
 (1.505) (0.988) (0.000444) (0.000232) 
Time -0.381 1.728** 0.000892*** 0.000766*** 
 (0.567) (0.711) (8.82e-05) (0.000142) 
Time2 0.00274 -0.00783 -1.08e-05*** -1.00e-05*** 
 (0.00582) (0.00624) (1.33e-06) (1.52e-06) 
Ln(Per Cap Income) 129.2*** 65.37*** 0.00999*** 0.0126*** 
 (11.67) (16.07) (0.00170) (0.00286) 
Lag ln(State Pop) -2.96e-07*** -7.24e-07*** -3.78e-10*** -6.01e-10*** 
 (1.07e-07) (1.69e-07) (0) (0) 
All Welfare FTE -9.57e-05*** -3.96e-05 1.09e-08 1.08e-07*** 
 (2.28e-05) (8.46e-05) (1.10e-08) (3.38e-08) 
Constant -1,145*** -547.4*** -0.0645*** -0.0881*** 
 (105.3) (145.9) (0.0158) (0.0263) 
Observations 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 
R-squared 0.793 0.906 0.667 0.856 
Number of groups 50 50 50 50 




NY Synthetic Control Tables 
 
State Weight State Weight 
Alabama 0 Mississippi 0 
Arizona 0 Missouri 0 
Arkansas 0 North Carolina 0 
Colorado 0 North Dakota 0 
Georgia 0 South Carolina 0 
Idaho 0 Tennessee 0 
Indiana 0 Texas 0 
Kansas 0 Utah 0 
Kentucky 0 Virginia 0 
Lousisiana 0 West Virginia 0 
Maryland 0.305 Wyoming 0.695 
 
 
Matched Variable For New York Treated Synthetic  
Log of State pop 16.6636 13.40326 
Log of Real per capita personal income 9.756578 9.580184 
Log of Real state private GDP per capita 9.982729 9.807959 
Total Spending Per cap in 1957 2132.825 2060.881 
Total Spending Per cap in 1967 3630.594 3461.445 
Average of Collective Bargaining Laws 2 2.151636 
 
Ohio Synthetic Control Tables 
 
Matched Variable For Ohio Treated Synthetic  
Log of State pop 16.158 15.69558 
Log of Real per capita personal income 9.777103 9.758545 
Log of Real state private GDP per capita 9.940333 9.904009 
Total Spending Per cap in 1965 2143.121 2142.037 
Total Spending Per cap in 1975 3291.432 3293.42 












State Weight State Weight 
Alabama 0 Mississippi 0 
Arizona 0 Missouri 0 
Arkansas 0 North Carolina 0 
Colorado 0.188 North Dakota 0 
Georgia 0 South Carolina 0 
Idaho 0 Tennessee 0 
Indiana 0.047 Texas 0.588 
Kansas 0 Utah 0 
Kentucky 0 Virginia 0 
Lousisiana 0 West Virginia 0 
Maryland 0.157 Wyoming 0.021 
 
South Dakota Synthetic Control Tables 
Matched Variable For South Dakota Treated Synthetic  
Log of State pop 13.43043 13.79124 
Log of Real per capita personal income 9.384126 9.374831 
Log of Real state private GDP per capita 9.377846 9.519726 
Total Spending Per cap in 1959 1776.953 1824.804 
Total Spending Per cap in 1969 2823.867 2821.605 
Average of Collective Bargaining Laws 2.142857 2.141114 
 
State Weight State Weight 
Alabama 0.099 Mississippi 0 
Arizona 0 Missouri 0 
Arkansas 0 North Carolina 0 
Colorado 0 North Dakota 0.196 
Georgia 0 South Carolina 0.301 
Idaho 0.192 Tennessee 0 
Indiana 0 Texas 0 
Kansas 0 Utah 0 
Kentucky 0 Virginia 0 
Lousisiana 0 West Virginia 0 
Maryland 0 Wyoming 0.211 
 
